Almost
forty years after the military coup d’état that ousted the
democratically elected government of Salvador Allende,
historians are still striving for a thorough and nuanced
understanding of U.S.–Chilean relations between 1970 and
1973. Not
surprisingly, many students of the period have focused on
the more dramatic aspects of the story, namely, the role of
the Central Intelligence Agency and Department of State in
trying to prevent Allende’s election via the covert actions
known as Track I and Track II and the complicity of the CIA
and the Nixon administration in the military coup of
September 11, 1973 that ushered in the Pinochet regime.
Unfortunately, this
emphasis has come at the expense of a thorough examination
of U.S. foreign policy during the three years of Allende’s
presidency.
The often-overlooked Nixon Tapes, which were in operation
for approximately 85 percent of Allende’s tenure in office,
are one source that can help re-focus the debate on U.S.
policy, particularly the Nixon Administration’s response to
the
Allende Government’s expropriation policy.
To that end,
nixontapes.org is pleased to bring you a selection of over
80 pages of excerpted transcripts on Chile and Allende.
For the first time, we are pleased to make the collection of
annotated transcripts available as a downloadable briefing
book. To download all
of the transcripts, click
here.
This briefing book should be considered only as a starting
point for tapes research on Chile.
To facilitate future
research, we have also prepared a comprehensive list of
all declassified
Nixon Tape conversations related to Chile and Allende
here,
with tape logs and the accompanying audio for complete
conversations.
List of Conversations with
Synopses of Transcribed Excerpts
For a key to participants’ names, click
here
(136k).
Conversation |
Date |
Participants |
Audio |
460-027 |
2/26/71 |
P, HAK |
clip1
(1m, 1:04) |
The earliest mention of Allende on the taping system
concerned the possibility of having the
U.S.S. Enterprise make a port of call at Valparaiso, Chile.[ii]
In spite of the fact that Allende had been in office
for less than four months, relations between the
Chilean and U.S. government were already abysmal.
Nixon curtly dismissed Allende’s offer to show U.S.
sailors “authentic democracy” as being used for the
“worst, damn propaganda purposes.”
Transcript
|
Summary
462-005 |
3/5/71 |
P, HAK, AMH, RMH |
clip1
(1.8m, 1:54) |
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clip2
(1.4m, 1:27) |
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clip3
(877k, 0:54) |
Over the course of a wide-ranging discussion
of political affairs in Europe and Latin
America, DCI Helms warned the President of
the “wave” of radicalism throughout Latin
America following, among other things, the
election of Allende, and he advised the
President against taking a softer line
against Cuba. Nixon heartily concurred,
lamenting the fact that the Catholic Church,
both in Latin America and in the United
States, was no longer serving as a bulwark
of conservatism and stability in the region.
Nixon also gave vent to his oft-expressed
belief that “Latins” (be they European or
American) required “strong leadership” in
order to function effectively.
Transcript |
Summary
245-006 |
4/6/71 |
P, HAK |
clip1
(2.2m, 2:16) |
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clip2
(389k, 0:23) |
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clip3
(262k, 0:16) |
Following the resounding victory of the
Allende bloc in the Chilean municipal
elections (49.5% of the total vote), Nixon
and Kissinger surveyed the damage and
ruminated on future developments.[iii]
Although Allende had come to power legally,
Kissinger opined that he would follow the
“German strategy” of gradually eliminating
dissent in order to create a “fascist”
state. Kissinger then lamented the position
of the State Department, which had doggedly
supported the Christian Democrats at the
expense of conservative candidate (former
President Jorge Alessandri), even though the
only thing that distinguished Allende from
his predecessor, Eduardo Frei, was that the
latter was a Catholic, i.e. a Christian
Democrat. Nixon concurred and laid some of
the blame for Allende’s election on the U.S.
Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, who,
Nixon charged, had allowed his “liberal
Democrat” biases to color his judgment in
favor of Frei.[iv]
Ironically, although Korry had played no
role in the CIA operation to prevent
Allende’s election, the Ambassador was
fanatically opposed to Allende, cabling
Washington after the election that, “There
is a graveyard smell to Chile, the fumes of
democracy in decomposition. They stank in my
nostrils in Czechoslovakia in 1948, and they
are no less sickening today.”[v]
Rather than risk having Korry (a former
journalist) speaking out, however, Nixon
advised buying his silence by reappointing
him to another ambassadorial post.
Transcript |
Summary
487-007 |
4/23/71 |
P, HAK, RLZ |
clip1
(508k, 0:31) |
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clip2
(1.3m, 1:20) |
Nixon’s concerns regarding Korry proved well
founded, when Korry wrote a letter of
complaint to Nixon once he learned of the
President’s decision to replace him. Nixon
emphasized to Kissinger that it was
imperative that Korry be appointed, at least
“until after the [1972 Presidential]
election,” since the ambassador “has a hell
of a lot of information of what we did down
there.”
Transcript |
Summary
Following a meeting regarding U.S. policy on
expropriation on the Presidential yacht
Sequoia
on June 10, 1971 (details of which have yet to
be declassified) the Administration’s hard-line
position gradually began to take shape.
A number of important meetings took place the
day after the
Sequoia meeting. During this first meeting, Nixon and Kissinger
discussed Chilean attempts to secure new loans
and renegotiate their existing obligations.
Nixon fumed over the unwillingness of the
Congress to do more for Brazil, which, in
contrast to Chile, was led by “friends” of the
United States. Nixon and Kissinger also
discussed the assassination of the former
Chilean Cabinet Minister,
Edmundo
Pérez Zujovic, on June 8, 1971 by a Chilean
anarchist group, Vanguard of the People. Nixon
and Kissinger chuckled at the Allende’s
accusation that the CIA had orchestrated the
assassination, noting that Zujovic was a
conservative opponent of Allende, and probably
the last person the U.S. Government would want
to assassinate. Besides, as Kissinger noted, the
CIA was too “incompetent” to pull off such an
operation, recalling that the last person whom
the CIA assassinated had lingered for three
weeks before expiring.[vi]
Rather, both Nixon and Kissinger feared that Allende was behind the
assassination and would use the event as a
fraudulent
casus belli to declare martial law and establish a “one-party
government.” Kissinger brought up the example of
Hitler again, asserting that Allende was
gradually taking control of the media and
eliminating the military as an independent actor
by “building
them up while neutralizing them.”
Although Nixon shared Kissinger’s fears, oddly
enough, he opposed establishing closer ties with
the Chilean military, since he believed U.S.
efforts to cultivate it had heretofore been an
abject failure. Finally, the President
instructed Kissinger to bring in Secretary of
the Treasury John Connally for meeting in the
Oval Office, since Nixon was sympathetic to
Connally’s position of taking a hard line on
expropriation.
Transcript |
Summary
Connally soon joined Nixon and Kissinger in the
Oval Office, where he propounded at great length
upon the threat posed by Allende’s
nationalization policy to American interests
elsewhere in the region.[vii]
Nixon shared with Connally his frustration with
the IMF and World Bank, which he believed were
not doing enough to use their financial leverage
against Third World nations that had or were
pursuing nationalization without adequate
compensation.
Neither Connally nor Nixon realistically
expected that the U.S. Government could use
force to coerce other nations into abandoning
nationalization. In that sense, their positions
were not dissimilar from those expressed by
State Department. The difference lay in the fact
that Connally urged the President not to
passively accept nationalization without
compensation. Only energetic action could set an
example for other nations considering following
Allende’s lead: “And the only thing, the only
pry we have on ’em, the only lever we have on
’em, it seems to me, is at least if we could
shut off their credit, or shut off the markets
for the commodities they produce, or something.
But we have to be in a position to impose some
economic sanctions on ’em. Now, you can’t impose
military sanctions, but we can impose financial
or economic sanctions.” In light of the
opposition of the State Department and its Latin
American Division (which Nixon described as a
“disaster area”), Connally suggested the
possibility of the President “issuing a
statement, a statement of policy—a White Paper,
so to speak—in which he instructs all the
government that as a matter of policy, this
government will not vote for, nor favor, any
loan to any country that has expropriated
American interests, unless until that country is
furnishing good and sufficient evidence that
satisfactory payment has been made.”
Nixon heartily concurred, adding that a failure
to take tough action was “going to encourage
others to go and do likewise.” Consequently, it
made sense to establishing a precedent and “find
a place to kick somebody in the ass.” Rather
than indulge Allende’s excesses, Nixon was happy
to let the Soviets shoulder the burden: “Let it
be a drain on the Russians. I just have a
feeling here that I think we ought to treat
Chile…like we treat this damn Castro.”
Transcript |
Summary
517-022 |
6/11/71 |
P, HAK, HRH |
clip1
(1.2m, 1:12) |
Following his conversations
with Kissinger and Connally, Nixon was no mood
to hear about the State Department’s objections.
Upon being informed that Secretary of State
Rogers opposed Connally’s suggestion, Nixon
snapped: “We sure as hell can do something about
expropriation. Don’t you agree, Henry? Should we
just simply lie back and let them expropriate
things around the world? Screw ‘em.” Kissinger
concurred, noting that “unless we become too
dangerous to tackle, there’s gonna be a constant
erosion of our international position.”
Kissinger
then harkened back to the days of John Foster
Dulles’ tenure at Foggy Bottom (i.e. the period
of the coup d’états against Mossadeq and
Arbenz), when “people were just too afraid to
tackle us.”
Transcript |
Summary
523-004 |
6/16/71 |
P, JDE, CBd, PGP |
clip1
(4.9m, 5:04) |
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clip2
(680k, 0:42) |
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clip3
(2.3m, 2:22) |
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clip4
(6.7m, 6:56) |
Charles (Charlie) Bluhdorn was
Richard Nixon’s kind of businessman: Self-made,
confident, well-connected, dynamic, fiercely
anti-Communist, and at least rhetorically
committed to improving the quality of life for
the people who worked for him. Bluhdorn met with
Nixon, Ehrlichman, and Secretary Peterson on
June 16, 1971 to deliver a personal appeal to
Nixon from the president of the Dominican
Republic, Joaquín
Balaguer. Through Bluhdorn, Balaguer wished to
draw Nixon’s attention to the fact that the U.S.
Congress had cut the Dominican Republic’s sugar
quota, while other nations that had nationalized
American firms (such as Peru) had escaped a
quota reduction.[viii]
Bluhdorn poured scorn on the position of State Department officials, who
claimed that “we
[the United States] cannot retaliate against
people who mistreat Americans, because the
experience of the past has been that when we
retaliate against them, then they only escalate
against us,” caustically suggesting that, if
this was to be the position of the U.S.
Government, “perhaps one of the companies we
should also start in the Dominican Republic is a
company making umbrellas, because perhaps we can
supply some of the umbrellas that Mr.
Chamberlain used.” Bluhdorn then
warned his audience, “if it’s going to
become…a free-hunting session, where everybody
can feel that they can take anything American
away, then we’re really in trouble.”
Nixon expressed complete agreement, telling Bluhdorn: “I
have no patience for the attitude… that, with
regard to Peru, Bolivia, or Chile, gives them
treatment that is the same as the Dominican
Republic.” According to Nixon, the State
Department was “against Brazil and the Dominican
Republic for the wrong reasons. They’re against
them because they think they’re both
dictatorships. I like them…not because they’re
dictatorships, but because they’re friends of
the United States.” Nixon then promised that,
“Friends of the United States will be rewarded!
Enemies of the United States will be punished!
And that includes Peru to the extent we can. It
includes Bolivia to the extent we can. And it
includes, by all means, Chile, to the extent we
can. That’s the way the game has to be played.”
Transcript |
Summary
262-005 |
7/19/71 |
P, JBC |
clip1
(1.7m, 1:44) |
In order to facilitate Nixon’s
policy of handling “friends” in Latin America
differently than recreants such as Chile and
Bolivia, Connally suggested that Nixon
eventually consider a policy of divide-and-rule,
whereby the United States would withdraw from
the Organization of American States [OAS] in
favor of establishing stronger bilateral ties
with individual republics. That way, the United
States could “put the screws” on expropriating
nations such as Peru, Chile, and Bolivia,
without “offending” other nations.
Transcript |
Summary
584-003 |
10/5/71 |
P, HAK, JBC |
clip1
(1.7m, 1:45) |
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clip2
(930k, 0:57) |
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clip3
(90k, 0:05) |
In the wake of the Chilean
Government’s decision to effectively reject
paying compensation to either Kennecott or
Anaconda by retroactively applying $774
million in excess profits taxes, Nixon and
Connally decided to take the gloves off.[ix]
Connally derided Allende’s actions as a
“farce” and advised Nixon that the Chilean
President had “thrown down the gauntlet to
us. Now, it’s our move.” “I have decided,”
Nixon replied, “You give us a plan, we’ll
carry it out.” Nixon then vowed that “we’re
going to play it very tough with him
[Allende],” and that he had “decided we’re
going to give Allende the hook.” Connally
egged the President on, admonishing him to
take tough action against the “enemy”
Allende: “The only thing you can ever hope
is to have him overthrown, and, in the
meantime, you will make your point to prove,
by your actions against him, what you want,
that you are looking after American
interests.” When Nixon promised to make an
example of Allende, Haldeman observed that,
“It would earn a bit with the right‑wing
in this country.” After Connally left, Nixon
provided a recap for Kissinger’s benefit: “I
said, ‘All right, you give us a plan. I’m
goin’ to kick ‘em. And I want to make
something out of it.’ That’s my view.” When
asked for Kissinger’s opinion, Kissinger
replied, “I would go to a confrontation with
him; the quicker the better…Maybe not in a
brutal way, but in a clear way.” He also
agreed to work with Connally in order “to
figure out the confrontation.”
Transcript |
Summary
587-007 |
10/8/71 |
P, JDE, RMH |
clip1
(2.3m, 2:24) |
President Nixon’s hostility
toward DCI Richard Helms is well known. As
such, the DCI was rarely granted the
privilege of a personal meeting with the
President. One exception came on October 8,
1971, when, in the presence of Ehrlichman
(who was there in the capacity of the
President’s lawyer and therefore bound by
attorney-client privilege), Nixon and Helms
had a wide-ranging conversation covering
past and future CIA operations. Nixon had
called in his DCI to find out about previous
agreements that had been negotiated with the
Soviet Union, such as the one that ended the
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Nixon had
initially tried to delegate the task to
Ehrlichman, who apparently served as Nixon’s
intermediary with the Intelligence
Community. Ehrlichman had, however, been
rebuffed by the Helms, who did not want to
release the relevant “dirty linen” unless he
had assurances about to whom they would be
distributed. Over the course of their
wide-ranging conversation, Nixon reaffirmed
his both commitment to protect the agency,
and his support for “dirty tricks”: “We have
got to be in a position where if the
Russians or the Chinese are in a particular
little country trying to screw it up, we can
screw it up, too.” Nixon also conceded that
more should have been done to prevent
Allende’s election in 1970.
Transcript |
Summary
287-007 |
10/11/71 |
P, HAK |
clip1
(1.3m, 1:18) |
Following the Chilean
Government’s decision to levy a retroactive
excess profit tax on the American companies,
Kissinger informed the Chilean Ambassador
that “certain consequences” would follow if
the Chileans refused to be “reasonable.”
Transcript |
Summary
303-009 |
10/26/71 |
P, JBC |
clip1
(6.7m, 6:59) |
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clip2
(1.2m; 1:12) |
Nixon’s anger at nations that expropriated U.S.
businesses often boiled over. “I think we
have got to start putting the screws on
those damn things,” he exclaimed to John
Connally during a meeting at his hideaway
office in the Executive Office Building.
Nixon was tired of working with
multinational organizations such as United
Nations (“a total pain in the ass for us”).
Despite the fact that the United States
effectively bankrolled the U.N., Nixon
contended, it never received any credit from
nations that received international aid.
Rather, these nations expressed their
gratitude by, for example, defying the
United States and expelling Taiwan from the
United Nations.[x]
By then, Nixon had clearly warmed to Connally’s advice to
restructure U.S. relations on a bilateral
basis: “The United States has got to look
after its own interests on a
country-by-country basis. The time of a
great United States multilateral interest…we
aid without conditions and all that; that’s
gone. That is utterly gone.” Nixon also
expressed his support for an amendment
proposed by Senator Russell Long (D-LA),
which mandated that all U.S. aid to nations
that expropriated American assets be
cancelled (at the time, the Hickenlooper
Amendment gave offending nations a six-month
grace period to take “appropriate steps… to
discharge its obligations under
international law”).[xi]
Summarizing the foreign policy situation, Nixon
emphasized the need to continue the policy
of triangular diplomacy, and “to stand up in
various parts of the world, and stand up
very vigorously for its interests. And,
whether it’s with Chile on their
expropriation, or whether it’s a vote like
this [on Taiwan’s expulsion from the United
Nations], where we ask a lot of these
goddamn stinkin’ Africans…to come with us,
we’ve got to find ways where the United
States can, frankly, throw its weight around
in an effective way.” Nixon calculated that
such a message would resonate with the
American public, which wanted the government
to “follow policies that keep us from
getting kicked around, policies that will
look after our selfish interests as against
other countries.” Connally shared Nixon’s
instincts regarding the political utility of
a punitive program: “In a time of
frustration and uncertainty and division
within the country, you frequently, and more
often than not, drive home a position and a
feeling and a support—you arouse a support
out of a negative position much quickly than
you can out of an affirmative position.”
Ironically, Connally then advised Nixon to run on a platform of
“change”: “No point in you trying to defend
what all is happening. No point in trying to
run on your record, so to speak. You got to
run in terms of how you’re going to change
things. You’re going to kick the hell out of
the Chileans, or you’re going to, you’re
going to denounce the U.N….” Connally
advised that the President to find “some
real enemies,” since, in the wake of détente
and the opening to the People’s Republic of
China¸ “Communism ought not to be your
battle.”
Transcript |
Summary
313-021 |
1/10/72 |
P, HRH |
clip1
(1.4m; 1:29) |
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clip2
(614k; 0:38) |
A brief discussion of Korry’s future
with the Nixon Administration offers a
tantalizing, but ultimately
inconclusive, hint that Kissinger may
have been trying to downplay the extent
of his relationship with Korry to the
President.[xii]
Having been informed by Chief of Staff
Haldeman that the National Security
Advisor was trying to have Korry
appointed to a position with the
Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW), Nixon denied that
Kissinger was “representing” the
President’s wishes, “unless Kissinger’s
got some goddamn thing that he pulled
with him that he’s trying to cover up.”
Transcript |
Summary
649-001 |
1/17/72 |
P, JBC, HRH |
clip1
(1.6m; 1:40) |
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clip2
(3.3m; 3:23) |
Nixon drew some satisfaction from the
election reverse suffered by Allende’s
bloc in January 1972, but his fury was
once again roused when he learned from
Connally that the State Department had
defied the President’s instructions by
informally notifying the Chilean
Government that it could expect
successful renegotiation of its foreign
debt during the upcoming “Paris Club”
meeting.
“I told Henry,” Nixon fumed to Connally
and Haldeman, “at the time Allende came
in, we were not to do a damned thing to
help him. Absolutely nothing!” Connally
conceded that there was little the
President could do about Chile at the
moment, since, in an election year,
“you’re operating with your hands tied
behind your back now.” That said, while
the President could not “do anything
about it this year…with another four
years you can.”
Although Nixon agreed with Connally, he
could not be consoled since State’s
end-run had robbed him of his one
effective weapon against Chile: “Our
major stroke in international affairs is
our economics.” In the wake of Vietnam,
Nixon realized that stronger action was
simply not feasible. “We can’t send men,
now, anymore. I mean, as we well know, I
hate fighting these damned wars and
things, and so…the major thing we can do
is squeeze them economically. And,
believe me, that can have one hell of an
effect. One hell of an effect.” Nixon
then reemphasized his determination to
defend his prerogatives over matters
such as Chile against the meddling of
“unelected” bureaucrats at State, and,
if necessary, to take the blame for the
consequences.
Transcript |
Summary
650-012 |
1/18/72 |
P, JDE, GPS |
clip1
(1.2m; 1:14) |
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clip2
(1.5m; 1:35) |
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clip3
(745k; 0:46) |
The day after his meeting with Connally,
Nixon reiterated his determination to
have the Texan or his deputy, Paul
Volcker, lead the U.S. delegation to the
“Paris Club” meeting, with the
responsibility for ensuring “total
reciprocity” from the Chilean
Government. Nixon was also unimpressed
with the arguments of “soft-headed
bastards” who claimed that Allende was
“just a reformer” (like Castro before
him). “Now, that he [Allende] is
elected,” Nixon declared, “and he is
expropriating, and he is taking an
anti-American attitude in foreign
policy, to hell with him, at this point,
on renegotiating loans!” A tough stance
at the “Paris Club” was the “easy way to
take him on,” Nixon judged, because “I’m
not taking him on personally; not taking
him on rhetoric; we just drag our feet
at the negotiation.”
Transcript |
Summary
650-013 |
1/18/72 |
P, HRH |
clip1
(2.2m; 2:16) |
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clip2
(885k; 0:55) |
Apart from continuing the vent his
frustrations over State’s duplicity
concerning the upcoming “Paris Club”
meeting, Nixon reaffirmed his desire “to
give Allende the hook.” He also noted
that Bill Rogers’ position on
expropriation seemed to have moved
closer to Connally’s, which had not been
the case seven months before, during the
June 1971 meeting on the
Sequoia (the records of which have yet to be declassified).
Transcript |
Summary
652-013 |
1/20/72 |
P, MRL, WCW |
clip1
(3.9m; 4:06) |
During a meeting with Defense Secretary
Laird and Army Chief of Staff General
Westmoreland, Nixon stressed the need
for more “aggressive” action with regard
to arms sales in Latin America, since
“with the sales…goes the training, goes
everything else, and goes the stroke.”
Had the United States been more
effective at “playing our military
friends” in places like Chile, Nixon
mused, “Allende might not be there.”
Most importantly, the U.S. Government
needed to abandon its blanket preference
for civilian governments and understand
that, under certain circumstances, a
military government could better serve a
nation’s well-being: “You see, the
fiction is that if a government is based
on any kind of military support, that
it’s, by definition, thereby a bad
government. And, of course, the truth is
that sometimes it’s bad, sometimes it
good. But, if a government is solely
civilian…[it] can many times be worse,
and also one in which we have no
influence.” Nixon also wanted to
military attachés and advisers to show
greater initiative in cultivating
relationships with foreign governments,
and follow the example of “imaginative”
and “ruthless” General Vernon Walters
who, besides having “had a helluva lot
to do, as you know, with what happened
in Brazil,” was extraordinarily well
connected in the region.
Transcript |
Summary
654-001 |
1/24/72 |
P, HRH, PMF |
clip1
(209k; 0:12) |
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clip2
(3.1m; 3:16) |
The question of what do with Edward
Korry vexed Richard Nixon. On the one
hand, he would have been more than
willing to reappoint him to another
ambassadorial posting, had it not been
for the vehement opposition of Secretary
Rogers. On the other hand, the
Administration could not afford to leave
Korry feeling disgruntled, not only
because he had intimate knowledge of
“how we screwed up Chile,” but also
because of Korry’s powerful right-wing
media friends, such as William F.
Buckley and Irving Kristol. According to
Haldeman, Kissinger considered it vital
that Korry be reassigned at least until
after the 1972 Election, after which,
“he [Kissinger] couldn’t care less.”
And yet, this transcript reveals that
Nixon and others in the Administration
had some regard for Korry’s abilities.
Korry had proven himself a valuable
asset after leaving Santiago, as a
part-time consultant with the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).
Rather than “waste” an ambassadorial
posting on him (and risk Rogers’
opposition), Nixon suggested that Korry
be detailed to assist Connally in the
drafting on important study on “how do
we get the raw materials of the world
all lined up for the United States?”
Nixon seemed genuinely eager to retain
Korry on the payroll since, “You’ve got
to admit that he’s smart as hell. Very
imaginative…he’s articulate, and
somewhat emotional, and so forth. But,
he’s way above the average State
Department [ambassador],” whom Nixon
dismissed “as dumb as hell.” Flanigan
then broached the idea bringing Korry
onto his staff while leaving him on the
OPIC payroll.
Transcript |
Summary
320-028 |
2/8/72 |
P, JBC |
clip1
(2.0m; 2:05) |
Nixon adamantly refused
to relent on the economic pressure the
United States was applying on Chile. As
far as Nixon was concerned, “[The
Chileans] brought this on themselves;
they’re ruining the Chilean economy with
their expropriation and everything
else.” Nixon was deaf to the entreaties
of Chilean Ambassador and Leteiler that
a hard line on Chile would radicalize
the regime.
Backing off was not a viable option,
Nixon privately informed Connally,
because “it means that we are
subsidizing, basically, the
Communization of Chile.” Connally
concurred, adding that he was happy
having the Soviet Union to bail out
Chile, since “Russia can’t [even]
support themselves…” Both Nixon and
Connally had few qualms about the Soviet
Union playing a similar role in Chile as
it did in Cuba since, as Nixon saw
things, “Cuba sucks from Russia a
million dollars a day, and that’s one of
the reasons we are not going to change
our attitude toward Cuba. Let ‘em talk;
let ‘em pay a million dollars a day. Now
the same with Chile…If they want more
support from us, they must come a long
way.”
Both men also drew comfort from the
Allende Government’s defeat in two
by-elections, which was evidence for
Connally that Allende was not “doin’ so
well down there with his Communization.”
Therefore, it was imperative that the
United States press its advantage and
“just hold his feet to the fire…” Nixon
agreed, which was why he fighting the
State Department on the issue of Chilean
debt renegotiation at the “Paris Club”
meeting. Accepting the State Department
position, Nixon concluded, “would pull
him [Allende] right out of the trouble,
or help to pull him out.”
Transcript |
Summary
022-006 |
3/23/72 |
P, RLZ |
clip1
(1.1m; 1:07) |
The Administration was
forced into damage-control mode
following revelations of collusion
between the CIA and International
Telephone & Telegraph (IT&T) Company to
prevent the election of Allende in 1970.[xiii]
Over the course of brief telephone
conversation with Press Secretary Ronald
Ziegler, Nixon confirmed that Ambassador
Korry “had received instructions to do
anything short of a Dominican-type
[intervention].”[xiv]
Korry’s great sin, in Nixon’s mind, was
that, “he just failed, the
son-of-a-bitch. That’s his main problem;
he should have kept Allende from getting
in.”
Transcript |
Summary
724-004 |
5/15/72 |
P, PMF, DMK |
clip1
(1.6m; 1:38) |
Nixon was well aware
of the economic importance the
Soviets attached to détente, which
meant that he solicited the views of
American businessmen thinking of
expanding into the Soviet Union. One
prominent example was his old friend
and CEO of PepsiCo, Donald Kendall,
who had been present at the “Kitchen
Debate” with Nikita Khrushchev in
1959.[xv]
Kendall had visited the Soviet Union
as a member of trade delegation in
December 1971, and maintained
contact with members of the Soviet
Government, including the Deputy
Minister for Trade, Vladimir
Alkhimov.
Kendall shared his
thoughts following such meetings
with Nixon prior to the President’s
departure for the Moscow Summit of
May 1972. Besides the Soviets’
eagerness to rein in arms
expenditures and, in Alkhimov’s
words, “stop this military shit,”
Kendall concluded that, although the
Soviets “want to bring about
economic relations just with us,”
they remained committed to “the
spread of Communism.” That said, the
model the Soviets would follow in
future was not that of Cuba and
“confrontation” (i.e. armed
insurrection). Rather, Nixon should
expect “to see more of the things of
the Chile-type takeover,” whereby
the Soviets relied on “political
suasions,” much like the United
States did when “we go around trying
to support people that are
democracies.”
Transcript |
Summary
735-001 |
6/15/72 |
P, AMH, LEA, HAK, DFB |
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(6.5m; 6:45) |
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An essential aspect of Nixon’s
strategy in combating the
ideological threat posed by
left-wing radicals such Allende and
Castro in Latin America was
cultivating moderate figures such as
Mexican President Luis Echeverria.[xvi]
Echeverria’s own views regarding the
economic development of Latin
America complemented those of Nixon.
He contended that the lack of
capital, technology, and research in
Latin America could only be
surmounted if Latin Americans
“produce a system of balanced
investments, with shared
responsibilities, within a framework
of increased and strengthened
freedoms,” and rejected “a policy of
nationalization of the basic
resources of the country,” which
Allende had adopted.
Throughout the conversation, Nixon
referred to threat posed by Chile
and Cuba using the analogy of a
disease. He urged Echeverria “to
emphasize…in his talk with the
business leaders, that they cannot
look at Latin America as simply a
divisible entity…and if poison
afflicts one part of the body, it
eventually is gonna affect the
other. And, if the poison of
Communist dictatorship spreads
through Latin America, or the poison
of unrest and violent revolution
spreads through Latin America, it
inevitably will infect the United
States.” Nixon returned the theme
later in the conversation,
specifically alluding to Allende,
when he declared “it would be very
detrimental to all of us to have the
Chilean experiment spread through
the rest of the continent,” and
become “the wave of the future.”
Nixon also admonished Latin
Americans to abandon policies that
discouraged foreign investment, and
to face up their “responsibility to
provide stability in government and
some guarantee for the protection of
the right kind of private
enterprise…just as is the case in
his country.” Although Nixon claimed
not to “judge” Allende or to “know
what his plans for Chile may be in
the future,” he noted that a major
consequence of Allende’s policies
had been the flight of foreign
capital from the country. Nixon
conceded that the Chileans were
welcome to live with the
consequences of their actions, but
he warned that, “if the Chilean
experiment is repeated in varying
degrees in other Latin American
countries,” major American business
would be loath to invest in the
region, since “this instability in
government, the fear of revolution,
of expropriation, now makes
companies hold back.”
Nixon concluded his
discussion by asking Echeverria put
himself forward as a moderate
alternative to the Communists and
radicals: “Let the voice of
Echeverria, rather than the voice of
Castro, be the voice of Latin
America.”[xvii]
Transcript |
Summary
026-008 |
7/26/72 |
P, GPS |
clip1
(1m; 1:19) |
George P. Shultz became the
secretary of the treasury after
John Connally stepped down in
May 1972 to head the “Democrats
for Nixon” campaign. In this
phone conversation, Nixon
brought his new treasury
secretary, Shultz, up to speed
that his agency should “oppose
loans to any country that
expropriates” and “any country
that has kicked us around.”
Shultz and Nixon lamented the
State Department’s noncompliance
or “claws” against Nixon’s
preferred policy of dealing
toughly with countries that did
not fall into line with U.S.
interests.
Transcript |
Summary
751-014 |
7/24/72 |
P, et al. |
clip1
(2.9m; 2:58) |
Whatever else one
might say about the 1972
presidential election, the
choice could not have been
starker in Nixon’s mind. In a
private conversation with
Republican aides and backers,
Nixon accentuated the
fundamental and irreconcilable
ideological differences between
himself and George McGovern in
terms of foreign policy and the
role of the United States in the
international system.[xviii]
According to Nixon, besides the
fact that McGovern was “a man
who very honestly and sincerely
believes that American should
withdraw from its world role,”
McGovern, and the political Left
more broadly, were guilty of
maintaining double standards,
which was obvious if one studied
“what he [McGovern] said about
Chile, and about Allende and
Castro, as compared to what he
said about Greece.”[xix]
Nixon argued that
McGovern’s condemnation of the
Greek junta “enormously appeals
to his constituency, because
they are against dictators if
they’re on the Right, but not if
they’re on the Left.” Besides
being incredibly irresponsible,
since it would deal a “body
blow” NATO and “deny us the only
base from which we have to have
a viable policy in the
Mediterranean, and in the
Mideast” (especially its oil),
there was the matter of
“consistency”: “He
[McGovern] says that what we
ought to do is to improve our
relations with Allende, and
improve our relations with
Castro, despite the fact that
they are engaged in activities
that are very detrimental to us.
So you see the double standard
there.”
Transcript |
Summary
Other Resources:
-
94th Congress 1st Session, “Church
Report,” a.k.a. “COVERT ACTION
IN CHILE 1963-1973: Staff Report
of the Select Committee To Study
Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence
Activities,” U.S. Senate,
December 18, 1975:
http://foia.state.gov/Reports/ChurchReport.asp
-
Hinchey Report, CIA Activities in
Chile, September 18, 2000:
http://foia.state.gov/Reports/HincheyReport.asp
-
U.S. Department of State, “State
Chile Collections”:
http://foia.state.gov/SearchColls/CollsSearch.asp
-
Carlos Osorio ed., “NIXON:
‘Brazil Helped Rig The Uruguayan
Elections,’ 1971,” National
Security Archive Electronic
Briefing Book No. 71, June 20,
2002:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB71/
-
Peter Kornbluh ed., “Brazil
Conspired with U.S. to Overthrow
Allende,” National Security
Archive Electronic Briefing Book
No. 282, August 16, 2009:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB282/index.htm
-
National Security Archive, “Chile
Documentation Project”:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/latin_america/chile.htm
The views presented here do not necessarily reflect
those of the U.S. Government. This briefing book
utilizes only a portion of the tape materials on
Chile. Although we have reviewed each conversation
multiple times, readers are encouraged to consult
the audio and come to their own conclusions. We
would welcome transcript corrections or additions at
nixontapes@nixontapes.org.
[i]As
of the writing of this briefing book most of the
tapes dating from February to July 1973 have yet to
be declassified. Specifically,
Allende was in office
1,042 days, from his inauguration on November 4,
1970 to his death on September 11, 1973. In
Washington, Nixon’s taping system started in the
Oval Office on February 16, 1971 and ended on July
18, 1973—883 days, all of which took place while
Allende was in office.
One recent study that has utilized some of the Nixon
Tapes on Chile is Lubna Zakia Qureshi’s
Nixon,
Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973
Coup (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2008).
The authors wish to thank Dr. Qureshi for providing
draft transcripts of several conversations used
here.
[ii]
Benjamin Wells, “U.S. Declines Chile’s Invitation
for Visit by Warship,”
New York Times
(February 28, 1971), 3.
[iii]
Juan de Onis, “Allende’s Coalition Victor in Local
Elections in Chile,”
New York Times
(April 5, 1971), 1.
[iv]
Eduardo Frei was allegedly assassinated during the
regime of Augusto Pinochet, who took over after the
11 September 1973
coup d’état
against Allende. Alexei Barrionuevo, “6 Accused in
1982 Poisoning Death of Chilean Leader,”
New York Times
(December 7, 2009), A6.
[v]
David Stout, “Edward Korry, 81, is Dead; Falsely
Tied to Chile Coup,”
New York Times
(January 30, 2003), B9.
[vi]
It is impossible to positively identify the target
referred to by Nixon and Kissinger based on the content
of the conversation, although the person in question may
have been the former Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean
military, General
René Schneider. Schneider died three
days after a
botched kidnapping attempt by right-wing elements of the
Chilean military on October 22, 1970. The botched
kidnapping was the third attempt by two different groups
within the Chilean military, both of which had ties to
the CIA. Still, this off-hand reference is
circumstantial at best. For more information, please
see: U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information
website, “Hinchey Report: CIA Activities in Chile,”
online:
http://foia.state.gov/Reports/HincheyReport.asp#15 <accessed March 20, 2010>. See also:
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: The Declassified Dossier on Atrocity
and Accountability (New York: The New Press, 2004),
22–35.
[vii]
Connally had prepared a short memorandum for the
President’s perusal prior to the meeting, but he
apparently did not deliver it. Connally to Nixon,
“Expropriations in Latin America,” June 11, 1971,
FRUS: 1969-1976,
iv: Document 154. The taped conversation covered far
more ground than Connally’s memorandum.
[viii]
Balaguer was the President of the Dominican Republic from 1960-1962,
1966-1978, and 1986-1996. Bluhdorn, as the head of the
Gulf & Western Industries, had a substantial interest in
the Dominican sugar industry through the South Puerto
Rico Sugar Company.
[ix]
Joseph Novitski, “Chile Nullifies Payments for
Seized Copper Mines,”
New York
Times (September 29, 1971), 1.
[x]
Max Frankel, “End of China’s Isolation,”
New York
Times (October 26, 1971), 1.
[xi]
22 USC 2370.
[xii]
Kissinger argued that the 40 Committee that he
chaired as National Security Advisor (and which
“authorized but did not supervise” U.S. covert
actions) had abandoned any attempt to
precipitate a
coup
d’état (Track Two) nine days prior to the
run-off vote in the Chilean Congress on October
24, 1971 that would certify Allende’s victory
once it became clear that neither the Christian
Democratic Party nor the Chilean military had
either the means or the inclination to block
Allende. White House Years, 653-683.
[xiii]
In a story published on March 21, 1972,
columnist Jack Anderson referenced two
confidential ITT memoranda, one of which
stated that a CIA official had tried
unsuccessfully to get members of the Chilean
military to stage an “uprising,” while the
other detailed a conspiracy between ITT
executives to put economic pressure on
Chile, presumably because they feared that
Allende would nationalize ITT’s holdings in
the Chilean Telephone and Telegraph Company.
“Anderson Alleges Plot Against Allende By
I.T.T. and C.I.A.,”
The
New York Times (March 21, 1972), 23.
(ITT’s interests in the CTT were, indeed,
nationalized in September 1971. Michael
Jensen, “Chile Says it Will Nationalize
I.T.T. Unit in Days,”
New
York Times (September 16, 1971), 13.) In
a follow-up story published on March 22
(“ITT Pledged Funds in Chile”), Anderson
claimed that ITT had approached both the CIA
and the Nixon White House with an offer to
spend as much as “seven figures” to prevent
Allende’s election. Although the CIA had
been receptive to ITT’s overtures, the
response from the White House had been
“polite but cool.” Finally, Anderson
mentioned that, according to an ITT
intelligence report, Ambassador Korry had
“received a message from the State
Department giving him the green light to
move in the name of President Nixon.”
“I.T.T. Said to Seek Chile Coup in
’70,”
New York Times (March 22, 1972), 25; “I.T.T. is Accused of Having
Tried to Influence U.S. Policies in Latin
America,”
New York Times (March 23, 1972), 16.
[xiv]
Following a
coup d’état by “Constitutionalist” army officers in April 1965
supposedly aided and abetted by local and
Cuban Communists against a right-wing
dictatorship led by elements of the Trujillo
regime (which had themselves come to power
following a coup against Trujillo’s
democratically elected, left-wing successor,
Juan Bosch), President Lyndon Johnson
ordered the occupation of Dominican Republic
by a mixed force of U.S. and O.A.S. troops.
Fighting lasted until the end of August,
after which U.S. troops gradually withdrew.
[xv]
President and CEO of PepsiCo, 1971-1986.
[xvi]
President of Mexico, 1970-1976. Echeverria spoke
with Nixon in the Oval Office in the midst of a
state visit that included a speech before a Joint
Session of Congress and speeches in New York,
Chicago, San Antonio, and Los Angeles. Benjamin
Welles, “Mexican Chief Asks for Change in Relations
with U.S.,” New York Times
(June 16, 1972), 1.
[xvii]
The tenor of meeting was clearly in keeping with
policy outlined in NSDM 93.
[xviii]
Senator (D-SD), 1963-1981.
[xix]
On April 21, 1967, a group of Greek military officers
staged a coup
d’état (the so-called “Colonels Revolt”) to prevent
national elections that would have probably produced a
center-left government (possibly including members of
the Communist Party, which was banned at the time). The
junta initially ruled Greece in concert with King Constantine II,
until the King fled in December after leading an
abortive counter-coup against the military.