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Richard
Nixon Presidential Library and Museum Releases Additional 154 Hours of Tapes
from Fifth Chronological Tape Release
Tapes show Nixon was
willing to accept flawed Vietnam peace agreement without North Vietnamese
withdrawal or plan for Cambodia and Laos.
Kissinger:
"The major thing is that it's essential not to talk about it."
On June 23, 2009, the Nixon Presidential
Library released 154 additional hours of Nixon tapes originally recorded
between January and February 1973. With this release, 2,371 hours of
tapes have been declassified and released to the public out of a total of
approximately 3,700 hours recorded. This release was a sequel to the tape releases
that occurred on July 11, 2007 and December
2, 2008.
The topics discussed on these "Chron 5.3"
tapes include the Vietnam peace agreement including ancillary subjects such as
POWs/MIAs, postwar aid to the North and South, Cambodia and Laos, the end of
the draft and the beginning of the All Volunteer Force, and the lack of North
Vietnamese withdrawal from the South; Nixon's major second term government
reorganization, an emerging energy crisis, the future domestic political
situation, the Year of Europe, and Watergate.
nixontapes.org has obtained a copy of this new
tape release, and will be soon adding the complete audio, finding aids, and
analysis. For those who cannot wait to hear some of the real "gems", the following are
some excerpts from the January and February 1973 tapes.
- Also of interest may be the President's Daily
Diary, for:
- January 1-31,
1973 (pdf, 5.3m)
- February 1-28,
1973 (pdf, 6.3m)
- Sample conversation: January 3, 1973,
Oval Office, Unknown time between 3:32 pm and 3:39 pm
- President Nixon presents "Truck
Driver of the Year" Curtis C. Stapp with an award and Nixon discusses
his personal views on "courteous" truck drivers
- To listen to an audio excerpt, click here
(mp3,
1.2m, 1:26).
-
Nixon:
You know, the thing that always impresses me about those in your
profession is that, and I have often said this, is their enormous
courtesy. You know, you have this, you develop, I mean, I used to drive a
lot. I don’t now, because they have a driver. I haven’t driven a car
for four years. Well they, the Secret Service drives, of course. Anyway,
the way that, the people on the road [with the] truck drivers, they always
[unclear] cars [on], that courteous driving makes an enormous impression.
Stapp:
That has always been my [goal]—courtesy.
Nixon: Right.
Stapp: And I really think
that is what has helped me all these years. I feel that I am courteous.
Nixon: Yeah. Do you have
to have a physical exam every year? Is that done by the union?
Stapp: No, the company.
Nixon:
Company. And what do they give you—an exam for eyes and heart and
all that sort of thing, just to be sure?
Stapp: [A usual]
physical, just everything.
Nixon:
That’s very important. Because people can have some, you know,
[unclear], and they don’t realize it.
-
- Sample conversation: January 20, 1973,
White House Telephone, 1:04 - 1:46 am
- In a late night conversation, President
Nixon and Charles Colson discuss their hope for a Vietnamese peace
agreement, and also the future of the Democratic Party
-
- Excerpt 1:
Nixon discusses the possibility of a Thieu suicide, and suggests that
Kissinger was ready to give up during the negotiations (mp3,
527k, :33)
Excerpt 2: Colson informs Nixon that
Senator Hugh Scott has been taking on war critics (mp3,
703k, :44)
Excerpt 3:
Nixon states the peace agreement may not include U.S.-ally South Vietnam,
and that once the agreement is finalized, Colson is to go after those
opposed to the administration (mp3,
330k, :21)
Excerpt 4:
Nixon states that the press was more opposed to bombing in Vietnam than
the public; Colson agrees with the president, and states that that will
make "victory all the sweeter" (mp3,
1.1m, 1:11)
Excerpt 5:
Nixon again states that U.S.-ally South Vietnam may not be part of peace
agreement (mp3,
185k, :11)
Excerpt 6:
Nixon states that bombing in Vietnam was his idea, and he compares bombing
at the end of World War II and the Korean War with his decision to bomb in
Vietnam (mp3,
1.2m, 1:19)
Excerpt 7:
Nixon and Colson discuss what they think is left of the Democratic Party
after Nixon's 1972 landslide reelection, including the "Lavender
shirt mob": "blacks", "poor",
"intellectuals", "homos" and "queers" (mp3,
475k, :30)
-
- Sample conversation: January 23, 1973,
Executive Office Building, Unknown time between 6:22 pm and 7:23 pm
- President Nixon and Chuck Colson discuss
the Supreme Court decision Roe v. Wade
- To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3,
1.0m, 1:26).
-
Nixon:
What is the situation, incidentally, with regard to the Supreme
Court decision on abortion [unclear]?
[…]
Colson:
I mean, the weird thing about it, Mr. President, I’m not a
Catholic, but I’m—
Nixon:
I know, I know. I admit, I mean there are times when abortions are
necessary. I know that. You know [unclear] you have a black and a white.
[Unclear]
Colson:
Or rape.
Nixon:
Or rape.
-
- Sample conversation: January 23, 1973,
White House Cabinet Room, 8:38 - 9:05 pm
- First time new cabinet met
post-inauguration for Nixon-Kissinger briefing on Vietnam peace agreement
to be announced on national television that evening
- Excerpt 1: To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3,
958k, :59).
Nixon:
In terms of what it means for Cambodia and Laos, and so forth, I
think it’s a—Let me say this at this point, since this is
a subject that will come up with the [Congressional] leaders’ meeting,
in other words we’ll probably have to answer, I think it would be well
for Henry to take just a moment on Cambodia and Laos, because the Vietnam
thing is all I'm really going to talk about. But, I don't think there’s—this
various understanding that this covers Vietnam, and has an understanding, with regard to Cambodia and
Laos. Now, negotiating the understanding with Cambodia and Laos are not all that
specific, but they’re vitally important. Go ahead Henry, that a minute
on that.
Kissinger:
The major thing is that it’s essential not to talk about it.
Nixon:
That’s right. [You’ll all wait 'til] tomorrow when the
agreement comes out—
Kissinger:
Well, but that won't—
Nixon:
Even that—even that—
Kissinger:
But that won’t be in the agreement either—
Nixon:
That’s right.
Excerpt 2: To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3,
114k, :07).
-
- Kissinger:
There are factions there that are not all under control of the
parties involved.
- Excerpt 3: To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3,
981k, 1:02).
-
Nixon:
We hear it said that the United States by engaging in Vietnam has
harmed the world. I can assure you that if the United States did not prove
to be responsible in Vietnam, if we had ended this war with defeat, with surrender,
[if] the prisoners were withdrawn, the Chinese wouldn’t consider us
worth talking to, the Russians wouldn’t consider us worth talking to,
the Europeans, with all of their bitching, would not consider us to be
reliable allies. So what is involved here, which most of the members of
the Senate and the House eventually will understand, which all of us
around this table understand, is [that] the United States can play a role to
keep the peace, and as the only one who can save freedom in the world, we
have to be responsible. That’s what this peace is all about. [Applause]
- Excerpt 4: To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3,
345k, :22).
-
Nixon:
Without the success of the Vietnamization program, there could have
been no settlement. Because the South Vietnamese would not have settled
unless they were confident they could defend themselves. And the North
Vietnamese wouldn’t have had an incentive to settle if they thought that
the South Vietnamese were all that easy to knock over. So, Vietnamization
played a part.
-
Additional
excerpts:
-
1.
Nixon states that the North Vietnamese tried to stall due to Lyndon
Johnson's death (mp3,
516k, :33)
-
2.
Nixon states the agreement is not a perfect peace (mp3,
447k, :28)
-
3.
Nixon states that the conditions for peace have been met (mp3,
794k, :50)
-
4.
Nixon blames Lyndon Johnson and John F. Kennedy for their handling of the war (mp3,
843k, :53)
-
5.
Nixon reads an early edition of his television announcement (mp3,
680k, :43)
-
6.
Kissinger discusses the negotiating process (mp3,
1.6m, 1:42)
-
7.
Kissinger discusses the negotiating conclusion (mp3,
1.0m, 1:05)
-
8.
Kissinger discusses how the negotiating deadlock was broken (mp3,
841k, :53)
-
- Sample conversation: January 24, 1973,
White House Cabinet Room, 8:36 - 10:49 am
- Nixon-Kissinger briefing for
Congressional leaders on Vietnam peace agreement
- Excerpt 1: To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3,
2.1m, 2:17).
-
Nixon:
The Korea ceasefire, and I was in this room when we talked about
it. President Eisenhower had to order [as I recall]—he ordered devastating bombing and,
deliberately, in the case of civilian areas of North Korea, and that pricked the
boil and was done. But, we still haven’t got peace in Korea, as you know. That’s why
we deal with it [unclear] we’re working on it. As far as this is
concerned, we would have to agree, there are problems. You have raised
some of the problems. But, I would say that it would be extremely helpful
if the members of the House—the Congress, Democrat and Republican, to
the extent of the leaders that you can, that instead of consoling our fears on
this one—Don’t be, of course, going out and saying well, everything’s done,
it’s going to be all that. Be quite honest, and you’ve got to be
honest, but also don’t—I think it’s very important for us not to,
after getting this agreement, to send messages to Hanoi and messages to
Saigon that well, we don’t think it’s going to last, and all that sort
of thing. If you talk that way, the way [unclear]. It’s going to
happen. Now we’ve got to talk to—I would like if you can, you can simply
say what I said last night. It’s a good agreement. It’s peace with
honor. It not only ends the war for us, which of course, the prisoners-for-withdrawal deal, which many members of the House and Senate, just the week
after we announced the agreement, had voted for. The prisoners- for- withdrawal,
assuming the other side would have given it, which I think was very
doubtful—well, I
know it was doubtful—would have ended the war for us, and the war would
have continued with a thousand casualties a week for 50 million people, in
South [unclear], and Indochina, and in Vietnam. So what we have here is,
we’ve got our prisoners. We have more than that. We’ve got peace, not
only for America, but peace at least, as fragile as it may be, for all of
the people of Indochina, and certainly for Vietnam, for awhile.
-
- Excerpt 2: To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3,
562k, :35).
-
Kissinger:
There is no specific provision for the replacement of North
Vietnamese forces. There is a provision requiring the demobilization and
reduction of forces. Essentially, there is a provision that prohibits the
introduction of new personnel, of new military personnel. There is a
prohibition against the use of Cambodian and Laotian base areas. There’s
a prohibition against the use of infiltration routes through Cambodia and
Laos, and there is a prohibition against the movement of military units
across the demilitarized zone.
- Excerpt 3: To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3,
992k, 1:03).
-
Nixon:
The point is, the point I’m going to say is, that we’re not
going to indicate that it’s all going to be peaches and cream, that
there aren’t going to be any violations of the ceasefire. The Russians [unclear] going to go along. Le Duc Tho will make a statement today
which will be very conciliatory, and so forth and so on. After what Thieu
said last night, Le Duc Tho’s got to come out and say something. If
Thieu talks too much about victory, he’ll talk about victory. And the
response of the Russians, [and] the Chinese, their public statements may say one thing, and they may
do something else. What I am saying is that the United States, your
government, this administration, I can assure you, will use every
influence we have to bear to get the Russians and the Chinese—each of
whom wants something from us, and we want something from them—to
cooperate with us and see that this part of the world, which for 25 years
has [been cursed by war], the Japanese, civil war, and so forth, finally
has a period of peace. And that’s what it’s really all about.
- Excerpt 4: To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3,
2.1m, 2:16).
-
Aiken:
Now Mr. President, I just think we ought to face up to the hard
facts of life. The American people are hoping that this mess in South
Vietnam is over, and that the costs of the war will be over, and that the
defense budget can be drastically cut. And the bitter medicine in this
whole thing, and I think it’s inevitable, I’m not saying that, the
bitter medicine is that you’ve got to come out with billions of dollars
to support both South Vietnam and with billions of dollars to support
North Vietnam. I believe even LBJ earlier, and I think he on a previous
occasion has said we’ve got to spend a billion on war rehabilitation on
South and North Vietnam. And then, this is going to present an awful
matter, total, in
view of the fiscal situation in this country. And the American people are
going to be upset at the end of the war about how can you go on giving
billions of dollars over a long period to South Vietnam, and then the aid
to North Vietnamese. And that’s a bitter situation, and then when we put
that in the defense budget, it’s going to be bad. I think we can put it
in the foreign aid bill, and the foreign aid bill is the most unpopular
bill we have but defense is in such trouble that I don’t think we
better put it in defense, and the uprising among the rank and file man on
Main Street against rebuilding North Vietnam and Hanoi is going to be bad.
It’s going to be a hell of a situation. I think they’re happy today, but
they’ll be [unclear] as hell [in a few weeks] when they find out the
facts of life.
Nixon:
Well, I remember George when you and I were on the Herter
Committee. We knew it was going to be damned unpopular, soon after that war,
to pour those billions of dollars into Europe. But we had to come back and
sell it, because it was a darn good investment in peace. Let me also say,
however, it's a question of doubts. The question is here, in
comparison, yes, there will be some expenditures for economic and other
purposes in this part of the world. But, it’s going to be one hell of a
lot less than the expenditures of continuing this war. That’s the point.
- Excerpt 5: To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3,
987k, 1:03).
-
Jackson:
Mr. President, I thought maybe you could answer, maybe you’re
going to cover it, I don’t know, I shouldn’t ask it—
Nixon:
No, no, [you] can get this out of the way, right now.
Jackson:
The first thing we’ll all be hit with [is]: When will the list come
out, and other details regarding the supervision and the investigation of
all prisoners and their names? We’re just going to be deluged on that
one point, I would think.
Kissinger:
The provisions for supervision are being published today, together
with the other supervisory details. The list of prisoners will be handed
over on the day of signing, which is to say on Saturday—
Nixon:
Saturday.
Jackson:
They will be made public at that point.
Kissinger:
Then, they should be made public Saturday or Sunday. The
investigation of the Missing in Action and the visit to graves, a
procedure has been established for exchanging information and for
investigative teams to look into disputed cases.
-
- Excerpt 6: To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3,
1.0m, 1:04).
-
Nixon:
I’m not suggesting this peace is perfect. No peace that is
negotiated is perfect. The only one that is perhaps perfect in many things is unconditional surrender. And I may say, that has serious
shortcomings, too, in Vietnam. But I do say, this is
a peace that can work and give the
people of Viet—Southeast Asia a chance to determine their own future. And I can
only say thank God for those who stood by. I have great respect, as I say for
those who had a different view . Thank God for, also, a lot of brave men,
who went out there, and didn’t want to go to war any more than any of us
wanted to go to World War Two and the rest, brave as we all [taught them]. They gave
their lives, some of them became prisoners, and we ought to be damn proud.
-
Additional
excerpts:
-
1.
Kissinger discusses how deadlock happened in December 1972 (mp3,
775k, :49)
-
2.
Kissinger discusses how talks resumed (mp3,
471k, :30)
-
3.
Kissinger discusses the importance of January 9, 1973 (mp3,
1.6m, 1:40)
-
4.
Kissinger discusses North Vietnamese negotiating style (mp3,
272k, :17)
-
- Sample conversation: January 24, 1973,
White House Cabinet Room, Unknown time between 4:42 pm and 6:10 pm
- Caspar Weinberger FY '74 budget briefing
for Cabinet (portion on All-Volunteer Armed Forces)
- To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3,
362k, :23).
-
Weinberger:
This one shows the changing priorities. In terms of dollars,
defense has remained just about level since 1968 and ’69, almost exactly
level in dollar amount and it will again this time although it will go up
about three and a half to four billion dollars from ’73 to ’74
entirely because of pay and price increases, mostly associated with the
All Volunteer Armed Forces.
- Sample conversation: January 25, 1973,
White House Telephone, 6:18 - 6:22 pm
- President Nixon discusses sending
Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms to Iran as a special
emissary (Helms later served as U.S. Ambassador to Iran from 1973 to
1977). An excerpt of the transcript appears below.
- To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3, 2.7m,
3:59).
- To download the complete transcript, click here
(doc, 34k).
-
Nixon:
Well, what we—what I have in mind [is] I’ve talked to
[everybody] and everybody here thinks it’s a great idea, and I was
talking to Henry about this, what I really have in mind is for you,
basically, to be sort of a—without downgrading the other
ambassadors—the ambassador-in-charge of that sort of area. You know what
I mean?
Helms:
Yes, sir.
Nixon:
Particularly [what I want]. So, you could go down to those
sheikdoms and these other places and pull this thing [together], and then
give us the recommendations, you know. And it—And in charge of the area
not only in terms of oil and so forth, but in terms of stability of the
governments—
- Sample conversation: January 26, 1973,
White House Cabinet Room, 8:37 - 10:11 am
- Caspar Weinberger FY '74 budget briefing
for Republican Congressional Leaders (portion on All-Volunteer Armed
Forces)
- To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3,
5.1m, 5:25).
-
Weinberger:
This is the rather familiar story now to everyone except the press,
and that is that the priorities have changed very drastically. The human
resources expenditures, this is in dollars over here, have gone from about
sixty billion up to close to a hundred and thirty one billion by the end
of ’75. This is projected out through 1975. Defense stays just about
level in dollars, very little change at all, and in percentage, defense is
going way down. It’s under thirty percent now. And human resources are
about forty-seven percent of the total budget. So, the change there is
very dramatic, a complete reversal, and it is illustrative of the
different priorities that we now have. This is a little further
explanation of the defense outlays, 75, 76, 74.8, these are almost level
figures. And they will jump in 1974 about four billion dollars, but all of
that is pay and price increases. All of that is the amount associated with
the All Volunteer Armed Force and the other pay increases that have been
had in the military, plus the additional pension fund. There is no
increase in activity at all, [here] represented [there]. As a matter of
fact, there is a rather substantial decrease in the number of men that
will be in defense, and you can see that here. Here, with 1968 there were
three and a half million military personnel. This year, in 1974, the
president is requesting funds for 2.2 million, now, in a very steady
decline. But this line shows the average pay and allowances for each
person in the military, uniformed personnel. And that’s gone from
fifty-five hundred average to ten thousand dollars a year average, and
that’s where the increase has come, in the costs of military personnel.
We have another chart that isn’t blown up, but will be in the chart
book.
Unknown
[Arends?]: Could I ask a
question, is that approximate amount of money spent for defense still
approximately fifty-eight percent for personnel, personnel cost out
of the total budget of the military?
Weinberger:
That’s right. Yes, sir. The payroll costs in the military now run
just about fifty-eight percent, and the interesting figure you have here,
it’s in the chart book, I didn’t have it blown up. How much will a
billion dollars pay for? In 1964, a billion dollars would pay for 219,000
men. In 1974, a billion dollars gets a hundred thousand men. And,
actually, that’s
the different that has occurred on this question, and that’s why although there are sharp
reductions in defense, we stay just about level rather than having this
big peace dividend that everyone [unclear]—
Nixon:
The point, Les, let me [make a] point that you and John and the
Armed Services Committee fellows should be aware of—are aware of I am
sure, is this. That is why any comparison basically in dollar or ruble,
whichever way you want to explain it, of the amount we spend or percentage
of GNP or whatever you have, between ourselves and the Soviet Union, is
totally irrelevant, because when they put, say, seventy billion dollars,
shall we say, equivalent, in defense, if they put seventy billion dollars
in defense, my guess is the amount of their personnel costs is much less,
because—and their hardware is much more. They’re buying more hardware;
we’re buying more men. We pay more for the men. In other words, their
men come cheaper. Now, as a matter of fact, they have a bigger, because of
their great emphasis on land forces, they have [unclear], but
their costs for men are infinitely less than ours [unclear]. So, this poses—Let
me tell you about this defense thing, and this is where I am going to argue that the
other side [unclear]. God knows we’d like to keep it as low as we can,
but you have to have enough. You have to have enough in order to bargain,
as we go into the second round of SALT talks, and the rest, and MBFR, et
cetera. But
we also have to have enough for our own defense. And at the present time,
we see that number, fifty eight percent, all the costs going into
personnel, you aren’t buying a hell of a lot of hardware. You’re
buying a lot, but not as much. Roy [Ash], of course, one of the things
even though he is going to be now on the budget side of [State], that’s Roy
Ash, is acutely aware of this subject, right Roy? It’s a real problem.
Ash:
Certainly vis-à-vis what the [Soviets] are doing, actually it's
very critical—
Nixon:
Yes. Yes, sir. The main reasons with these comparisons, as we go down the line,
and say how much, if you look at our new stock, how much we’ve got,
and so forth and so on. We’ve got a huge outlay of men and women and so
forth in the Army, of course what you’re not getting [unclear].
Unknown:
Mr. President, I think we have to accept this is the price we have
to pay for an All Volunteer Army. [Agreement of several others.]
Nixon:
Because it is. And of course, let me say, I would hope when you
fellows go to campuses and so forth this year, if the All Volunteer Army
[means] not having them drafted, that’s not a bad point to emphasize. I
think it should have some appeal, shouldn’t it Jerry?
Unknown
[Ford?]: Mr. President, the American people wanted the All Volunteer Army,
so they have to pay for it.
-
- Sample conversation: January 31, 1973,
White House Oval Office, Unknown time between 4:52 pm and 6:13 pm
- Former Secretary of the Treasury John B.
Connally informs President of an emerging energy crisis
- To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3,
6.8m, 7:13).
-
-
Connally: I think, Mr.
President, you’ve got—you have two major problems—If I may
presumptuous enough to suggest two of the problems that you’re going to
face [unclear]—
Nixon: [Laughs]
You ought to know!
Connally: —right away. One, and
I—you and I have talked about this many times, and I’ll just mention
this and then leave it alone—But, I mentioned both of them to George
Shultz this morning—I’m going to tell you that he and I had breakfast
this morning—I think this energy crisis is much deeper, much deeper,
much more severe than anybody in this country realizes. And I think it’s
going to require a great deal of your personal understanding and
attention. You could well see gasoline rationing in the United States this
summer. You got fuel rationing now—fuel oil. You got gas rationing right
now.
Nixon: Really?
Connally:
And it’s going to get worse next year than it is this summer—at
this point. We don’t have the refinery capacity. And our demand
increases. And this—even [during] this last cold spell, universities
were shut down. The University of Texas, for instance, in Austin, Texas,
delayed it’s open—reopening for one week because it had no heat. The
San Marcos State Teachers College, where President Johnson went, could not
reopen. Many industrial concerns shut down their production completely,
because they had no fuel. The gas companies are rationing their industrial
customers anytime there’s a cold spell. Now, most of these customers can
use fuel oil. Like the utilities, they can burn fuel oil to generate
electricity. But, it’s more expensive for ‘em, so they like gas. Plus,
the environmentalists raise hell when they burn fuel oil. So, they don’t
like to do it. Fuel oil, now, is being laid down on the East Coast for
six—over $6 a barrel. I will not be at all surprised to see crude oil
laid down—if you can get it—on the East Coast of the United States,
this year, at five dollars a barrel. The idea that domestic crude is going
to kick the lid is stupid—it’s not going to happen. Foreign crude is
really going to happen—or, the price increase is going to happen for
domestic crude. Because this one of the things that the Arabs—OPEC,
that’s just the Arab nations’ doing—they are, in fact, taking over
control of the oil itself to market. They’re going to market it to the
highest bidder. And the highest bidder, it could be Japan, Germany, Italy,
and so forth. And the United States is going to have to posture itself,
very quickly, to get into this issue, where, as a nation, we can compete
with other nations in buying oil, because the oil companies can’t do it.
And I would predict that in this year, if not more than 18 months,
you’re going to see a complete revolution of the manner of production
and sale of oil, and pricing of crude products around the world. It’s
going to have a hell of an impact on this country.
- Sample conversation: February 3, 1973,
White House Telephone, Unknown time between 9:55 am and 10:59 am
- President Nixon leaks to Barbara Walters
that Henry Kissinger will take part in a round of talks in China following
his upcoming trip to Hanoi
- To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3, 4.0m,
5:47).
-
- Sample conversation: February 23, 1973,
White House Telephone, 3:29 - 3:32 pm
- President Nixon and Republican Party
National Chairman George H.W. Bush discusses "very attractive
women", and the need to get more "good looking" women
Republican candidates for political office
- To listen to the audio, click here
(mp3, 2.3m,
3:24).
-
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