nixontapes.org has obtained a copy of this new tape release, and will be soon adding the complete audio, finding aids, and analysis. The following are some excerpts from the newly released tapes from April to July 1973.

Also of interest may be the President's Daily Diary, for:

April 1-30, 1973 (pdf, 6.3m)

May 1-31, 1973 (pdf, 7.7m)

June 1-30, 1973 (pdf, 7.0m)

July 1-31, 1973 (pdf, 4.7m)

Sample Excerpt #1: June 4, 1973, White House Telephone 039-087, 11:16 - 11:22 pm

Kissinger conveyed the message that President Nixon had been invited to visit China again, following his first visit during February 1972. Nixon also extended an invitation to Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to visit either Washington or New York, the site of the UN. Nixon was concerned about whether he should visit China again before a Chinese visit to the U.S. (The first high level visit from the PRC did not come until 1979, with the visit of Deng Xiaoping.)

To listen to an audio excerpt, click here (mp3, 11.4m, 5:56).

Nixon: With regard to Mao, you know, that is quite significant, don't you think?

Kissinger: Oh, I think that's of enormous significant, Mr. President.

Nixon: The other thing I was going to say, though, that—

Kissinger: Because it means that they think that they are going to deal with you for the foreseeable future.

Nixon: Right. The other thing is do you think that we should get in—well we can't do it before you leave—but if you could get a message to the Ambassador here that we think it's very important for Chou En-lai to come to the UN. Or do you want to wait till August to do that?

Kissinger: I've already done that, Mr. President.

Nixon: You have?

Kissinger: I did that—

Nixon: You see—

Nixon: Oh, no, no, no. Because they can't get caught at it, I know.

Sample Excerpt #2: May 8, 1973, Oval Office 912-015, 12:34 - 12:56 pm

In a twist on ping-ping diplomacy, Brazilian soccer great Pele visited President Nixon for an exchange of greetings and gifts. Pele discussed the sport's rising popularity in the United States, and Nixon responded that the greatest American players were at Howard University in Washington, D.C. Pele discussed his interest in forming cultural exchanges between Latin America and the United States.

To listen to an audio excerpt, click here (mp3, 10.3m, 5:23).

Nixon: You are the greatest in the world.

Pele: [Handed Nixon a clipping from Sao Paolo while photographers take photos.]

Nixon: Do you speak any Spanish?

Pele: No, Portuguese. It is all the same.

Nixon: He always wins.

Nixon: The national champions of soccer in the United States are here in Washington, at Howard University. Here is a clipping of my visit with Pele to Sao Paolo in 1967.

Pele: Soccer is very different from American football.

Nixon: Do I know that! The main thing is to use your head.

Pele: Here is a film of soccer which I would like to present. I know you are busy.

Nixon: Sports films I watch.

Pele: It shows the world-wide soccer and the training that is required.

Nixon: You have no sons, but maybe your grandsons will want to learn from it. [Nixon handed out pens.]

Pele: Soccer is played more and more around the world and in the United States. My aim is to send soccer technicians to the U.S. and have your basketball technicians come to Latin America.

Nixon: That is a great enterprise and I wish you well.

Sample Excerpt #3: May 3, 1973, Oval Office 911-009, 9:48 - 10:12 am

President Nixon met with Ambassador David K.E. Bruce, the Chief-Designate of the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking (the precursor to the American Embassy, which came into operation in 1979). Nixon asked Bruce to be active in Peking socially so that he could observe the next generation of political leaders likely to assume power from aging leaders Mao and Chou. Bruce, one of the 20th century's most experienced American diplomats, assured Nixon that he had experience with secret negotiations and is willing to keep his work secret from the State Department, which they both agreed had "non-existent" security.

To listen to an audio excerpt, click here (mp3, 45.1m, 24:36).

Nixon: Well, the great thing for you, as you know, substantively, probably not a great deal will happen for a while.

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: But the most important thing about this is the symbolism. I mean, symbolism sometimes is not important, but now it is enormously important.

Bruce: The fact that—

Nixon: The fact that you are there. Let me tell you one thing I particularly would like to see. I know that the social world is a total pain in the [neck], but to the extent that you can, if you could get around, and have your colleagues get around and give us an evaluation of the people on the way up who are there now.

Bruce: Yes. Yes.

Nixon: You've got to understand, Mao will soon be leaving; Chou En-Lai is in his 70s but he's as vigorous as can be—terrific. You're really going to like him, you'll like them both. Chou En-lai is an amazing man. But on the other hand, except for some men in their 30s—late 30s and 40s—I don't see much coming up. And I think, you know, you can do that. Look around, see who the power is. That's the one thing that would be very important for us to know. Isn't it?

Bruce: Well, I think it is, yes. Because if they have sort of a collegial [unclear]—

Nixon: The Russians have quite a few in their shop that you know might come along.

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: And you know, an interesting thing, the Russians too [unclear], so pretty soon we know in four or five years there's going to be change there. But there will be a change in China. And the world changes. Well, there's that. Then, of course, the just, you know, your sense of the country, its people. I mean, I'm really, really more interested in that than I am in the routine cables, "Well, today we did this, or that, or the other thing. We signed an agreement." You know, this is how we grow figs.

Bruce: Exactly.

Nixon: Huh?

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: Don't you agree?

Bruce: I do agree.

Nixon: We're trying to see what this great—I mean, we've got to get along with this one-fourth of all people in the world. The ablest people in the world in my opinion—potentially. We've got to get along with them. It's no problem for the next 5 years, the next 20 years, but it's the critical problem of our age.

Bruce: Yes, I think it is.

Nixon: The other thing is, if you could, constantly of course, whenever you're talking, they're very subtle—and they're not like the Russians, who, of course slobber at flattery and all that sort of thing. But you should let them know how—two things: one, from a personal standpoint how much I appreciated the welcome while we were there. Second, we look forward to, some time, returning. Third, I would very much hope that Chou En-lai will see his way clear to come here to the UN.

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: Or something. I'd like to take him here, and it can be worked out in proper way. And fourth, and I think this is the most important, that I look upon the Chinese-American relationship as really the key to peace in the world. Always have in the back of your mind without playing it too obviously, the fact that the only thing that makes the Russian game go is the Chinese game. Always have in the back of your mind that if you say anything pro-Russian, [unclear]. Always have in the back of your mind that the Russians are their deadly enemies. And they know it, and we know it. And that we will stand by them.

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: And that's the commitment that I have made. I have.

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: How we do it, I don't know. But that's what keeps. Because David, what is probably in our time maybe that big collision could occur, and collisions even between enemies these days will involve all nations of the world, they're that big. So we want to avoid that, too. But my point is the Chinese must be assured they have one heck of a friend here. They hate the Indians, as you know.

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: Well, they don't hate them as much as they have contempt for them. They think that India is becoming a, you know, a sort of satellite of Russia. And of course the Japanese, they have a fear and respect for them as well. So with the Japanese, sort of say the right thing in terms of we want to get along with Japan and the rest. And it's very important that we have our, that we maintain our, in other words the shield there, because otherwise Japan goes into business for itself and that's not in our interest. And the other point that they're fairly interested in, looking at the world scene, another point, apart from the fact they'll go through the usual jazz [unclear] keeping revolutions in mind. That's fine. What they do in Africa I don't care anymore. But Europe. They don't want us to get out of Europe. Because they realize as long as the Russians have a tie down in Europe, that—you see what I mean?

Bruce: Oh, I do.

Nixon: So some of our well-intentioned Congressmen go over there and reassure them, "Oh, look, we're going to get out of Asia. We're going to get out of Japan, we're trying to reduce our forces in Europe." Well, that for the Chinese scares them to death.

Bruce: Well, I was struck by the conversations that you've had, and how they came back to the necessity about preserving forces in Europe. They were very pro-NATO for their own reasons. It was interesting.

Nixon: Absolutely.

Bruce: Well, I've got all those points in mind. Those conversations that you had there I've read. I must say they really are quite [unclear] fascinating to read.

Nixon: Yeah. You're one of the few in the country who's read them.

Bruce: I'd forgotten—but I do think they're absolutely fascinating.

Nixon: Yeah. A lot of history was made there.

Bruce: It was indeed. I think probably the most significant history, diplomatic history, of our time. No question about it. And I don't see anything, which could really ruin it in the time being. Without any hesitation I can tell you I always thought the preservation of good relations should have sort of ordinary courtesies and what not in the beginning, it'll probably be all business, but you try and get to know as many people as possible. [unclear]

Nixon: Let them think that we are strong, respected, and we're not going to be pushed around by the Russians or anybody else. Middle East—we have no answer there, as you know.

Bruce: I know.

Nixon: They haven't either. But I think the great irony is that today the United States of all nations is China's most important friend. [laughter] Romania? Tanzania? Albania? [unclear]

Bruce: That's pretty good stuff.

Nixon: My point is, with that in mind—would you like a little coffee?

Bruce: No, I wouldn't like some. I just had some.

Nixon: Oh, fine. I'll have a little, just a cup.

Bruce: But this is the most fascinating development, I think.

Nixon: It sure is.

Bruce: We must replace the policies that have become so embedded almost in the American consciousness that nobody in particular complained about it, and nobody intended [unclear].

Nixon: Look, for 20 years, do you know, we were sort of—now look, I'm supposed to be the number one Red-baiter in the country. I have earned that reputation for what you know very well. Had we just continued the policy of just a silent confrontation and almost non-communication with the PRC—

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: In the end we would reap a nuclear war. No question.

Bruce: Yes. Yes.

Nixon: We just had to breakthrough.

Bruce: Yeah.

Nixon: Also, as I said, it was so important to the Russian game.

Bruce: Terribly important.

Nixon: Yeah.

Bruce: Terribly important.

Nixon: Yeah.

Bruce: It must have [unclear]. How about does one explain to the Chinese that we want to preserve a relationship that has great importance to us, a meaningful relationship with Russia? The Chinese are undoubtedly our favorites between the two. But—

Nixon: The Russians are saying: Now look, this is very important. That Nixon is having another meeting with Brezhnev. There's going to be a lot of reasons for having that meeting. The important thing there to remember is that Russia and the United States are superpowers. That our interests do rub together in the Mideast and in Europe, particularly. That their rubbing together is a danger that is almost unbelievably great, and that under these circumstances we feel what we have to do is try to limit that danger as much as we can through communication. But, on the other hand, we do not consider putting it quite bluntly as between the two. We consider the Soviet, because of its power and of its longer history of expansionism, we consider it more of a danger that we have to deal with than we do China, which has a longer history of, frankly, defense. Now, I think a little of that is well worth saying. In other words—and also I'd be very blunt about it. Just say you've had a long talk with the President and there's no illusions—our systems are different. They're better Communists than the Russians are today. But we want to get back to our national interest. And the President considers—he's a man of the Pacific. He considers that China and America have a hell of a lot more in common than Russia and America, and that is the God's truth.

Bruce: Yes, that's true.

Nixon: And that therefore, looking at the historical process, I want to work toward that direction. And I think that's what we have to do. But the Chinese-American relationship can be the great lynchpin of peace in the world.

Bruce: Well, I'll tell you that after you've talked to Brezhnev, the Chinese will be filled in rather completely.

Nixon: Totally. I've instructed, I'll have, of course we'll be in touch with you, but we'll probably have Kissinger go over again. Incidentally, I want to tell you one thing. Normally on these visits when he goes, this is very important, he has sometimes met alone. So far. But in this instance, I want you to feel, David, that you are basically, not the State Department's ambassador, you are the President's, and I want you to be in on everything. You see what I mean? You've got to remember that we cannot—there's parts of these games that we don't want to go to the bureacracy. It's no lack of confidence in Bill or any of the others. But you know how it is. So will you have this in mind, please?

Bruce: I will, Mr. President. I certainly will. Because the security of the State Department is, in my mind, non-existent.

Nixon: It's non-existent.

Bruce: [unclear].

Nixon: That's right.

Bruce: No, I think that I understand that part of the [unclear]. And I think the back channel can be used [unclear].

Nixon: Well, I want to use the backchannel. And also, when Henry gets over there to do the briefings. I think it's very important that you be with him.

Bruce: Well, I would like that.

Nixon: So that you can, you know, get the feel of the thing, too.

Bruce: Yes, I think it would be on that occasion, good. They offered when they came to Paris in connection with the Vietnam peace talks taking me to secret meetings. And I was very indisposed to do it. I think it would have been a great mistake. I never would have been able to—

Nixon: Oh, yes. When you were there.

Bruce: Yes. But I think with China it's probably a different thing.

Nixon: Well, in China [unclear]. I'll see that it's done.

Bruce: All right, sir. I've only got one other thing, which I have not [unclear]—because they are behind the times with what's going on. This Cambodia thing, I wonder if it's possible to settle.

Nixon: I wish it were. We're willing to settle. China can have it. Whether they can still get that [unclear] Sihanouk back in I don't know. We don't care. The Cambodians don't want it at the moment. What ideas did you have? I mean, anything we can do—God, Cambodia is a terrible, terrible place.

Sample Excerpt #4: June 18, 1973, Oval Office 943-008, Unknown between 11:31 am - 3:12 pm

In the only record of this conversation, President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev met in the Oval Office. The only other person present was an interpreter, Viktor Sukhodrev. At times, the conversation is surprisingly personal, including a discussion of Brezhnev's family and initial hesitation to visit Nixon's home in California, the Casa Pacifica. Nixon and Brezhnev agree on a future schedule of summits,to be rotated between the USSR and the United States. They also discuss Brezhnev's schedule for the rest of the week, including a visit to Camp David.

To listen to an audio excerpt, click here (mp3, 44.0m, 22:53).

Brezhnev: But we have an omen in Russia that when it rains as you are leaving on a trip it’s a good sign. And it was raining by chance at the airport. It happened. But that, too—but that, too, is according to the Russian folk tradition a good omen. And especially since it was raining both in Moscow and in Washington, that makes it a double, extra good omen.Oh, I think that's of enormous significant, Mr. President.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, because of the ceremonies and all the protocol, I didn’t get a chance to say, and I want to do this right from the start, to extend to you the very good, the best wishes, greetings, and
good feelings of all my comrades, all my associates who saw me off at Moscow airport. It’s ok if I may talk?

Nixon: Oh, absolutely.

Sukhodrev: [unclear] Is that ok? I’ll try it.

Nixon: Try it. Ok.

Sukhodrev: Good.

Brezhnev: You see, I have a cigarette box there. It has a special timing mechanism and I can’t—I won’t be able to open it for an hour.

Nixon: Oh, how's it open?

Brezhnev: See, the mechanism, the timing mechanism is now working and I won’t be able to open that for another hour. In one hour it will unlock itself.

Nixon: [laughs] That’s a way to discipline yourself.

Brezhnev: That’s right. Mr. President, on a personal level [unclear] I need to just say that as I was being seen off at the airport in Moscow, and all my colleagues and my comrades were there, and I had a few words with them, and, well, I just said, “I thank you all for your trust that you vested in me for this visit for my talks with President Nixon, and I only hope that you will support me in all that we do together with the President of the United States.” And all of my colleagues who were there at the airport said they were absolutely confident that these new talks, at summit-level, between the Soviet Union and the United States, would yield new and truly historic results. And with those words, with that send-off, I climbed the steps up to the plane and flew off to Washington.

That was really a word-for-word—that was a word-for-word description of what went on at the airport, and how the world may be changed. And, also, last Thursday, when we had our regular meeting of our leadership, the Politburo of the Party, where we had a free discussion, a long discussion about Soviet-American relations, about all that has been achieved already, and all that we want to achieve in the future, and the prospects that we are aiming at, there was complete unanimity of views as regards the basic principles of the development of our relations and of the main questions on which we have achieved already a preliminary agreement and on those that we still have to discuss. Of course, there are certain matters that I have not raised in that forum before having had a chance to ask for your advice, consult with you on.

With all this hope, purely, personally, and at this meeting permit me to say that I have certainly come to this country with very good feelings, with good intentions, and with high hopes for these forthcoming negotiations.
Although doubtless certain problems are complex, and they may be difficult of solution for both yourself and myself, but I always believe that there are no—there are no situations out of which a way cannot be found, and there are no problems for which a solution cannot be found.

And if I might just make two personal points before we go over to official discussions—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Brezhnev: When you called it—the first thought I had [unclear] certain doubts about the San Clemente visit—.

Nixon: Sure.

Brezhnev: —and that’s why I came to you, to contact you through the Ambassador, but then when I learned that, Mr. Nixon, that you were very anxious for me to be there and go there. I am now—And I immediately responded. And I am—let me say that I am now really happy that I have revised my initial decision and I—and it was a personal decision on my part, and I do believe now, especially when I know that you—the symbolic—the symbolism that you put into the name of that house in San Clemente—.

Nixon: House of Peace.

Brezhnev: House of Peace [unclear]. Exactly, and I do believe—I’m, as I say, I’m happy that I am going there, and I do believe that thatsymbolism will turn into reality. And that is something that I [unclear]—

Nixon: [unclear]

Brezhnev: And the second point is a family—is a family one. Everything seemed to be going very well and I had hoped to come here with some of the members of my family, but, well, you see, my wife was not well anyway. She got a little worse and she was put to bed. And for a short time I hoped, but, anyway, that’s the way it happened. And then, I also wanted to bring my son along, but then he has his own kid. Now, the trouble is that his—my grandson, his son that is, is finishing his high school this year.

Nixon: Uh-huh.

Nixon: That's ok.

Brezhnev: So, there was really nothing I could do about it. But I—but I will say that Tricia [unclear] and made a very big impression on my children, and they still remember every minute of their meeting and the way they went along together. Well, I assured them that I will let them come to Washington to be able to spend some time with Tricia, the other of your—younger—and your other children. I will come. My son, my daughter, and my daughter-in-law wrote a collective letter and asked that it be given to Tricia, so I don’t want to give it to anybody else. I want you, as a father, to give it to Tricia.

Brezhnev: Thank you. Maybe some time in the fall.

Nixon: Sure.

Brezhnev: It is advised—

Nixon: Tell him the weather is good. It’s good anytime.

Brezhnev: They’ll be happy to hear that.

Nixon: Right. Also, I want to say before the others come in is that I very much appreciated the personal remarks that Mr. Brezhnev has made. [unclear exchange] We, we both—we must recognize, the two of us, that I for 3½ more years in this office and the General Secretary, I hope, for that long or longer, we head the two most powerful nations and, while we will naturally in negotiations have some differences, it is essential that those two nations, where possible, work together. And the key really is in the relationship between Mr. Brezhnev and myself. If we decide to work together, we can change the world. That’s what—that’s my attitude as we enter these talks. Thank you. [unclear; laughter] I know it’s all right.

Brezhnev: Well, thank you very much. And, in fact, I did indeed have two opportunities fairly recently to speak of you, Mr. President. Once was during my meeting with a group of American Senators, and I was speaking really from my heart—And, incidentally, let me proceed here to say that when I did meet the Senators, I was struck by the fact that they all, all of them regardless of party affiliation, evinced sincere—what I felt to be a sincere respect for you, Mr. President. And there was no attempt in any way to kind of, to sort of needle you through—in their—in the way they talked about you or in their general attitude.

And in fact, after the—After the meeting, Senator Hartke, who led the delegation, he came up to me separately, and he said that he had never had, just at the beginning of that conversation, and he had never before had such hopes for a better atmosphere in relations between our two countries as he now has after the foundation made jointly by the President and by myself. Now, he spoke really so highly, I was moved,I was deeply touched. Say, is he a Republican or a Democrat?

Nixon: Democrat. Very partisan. [laughter; unclear exchange]

Brezhnev: But, you know, Mr. President, if he spoke that highly of you always, well I’d live for nothing better. [unclear] And I was just recalling that I was asked once, during my meeting with President Pompidou at Zaslavl, one of the correspondents there, and I met some of them at the airport, they were asking me about my forthcoming trip to the United States and whether that was still on. I said—at that time I said, “Of course it is, certainly.” And then in Bonn, out walking with Chancellor Brandt, there was also—we came across a group of correspondents and one of them asked me, “Is your trip to the United States still on?” I said, “Well,” I said, “what are you expecting? A great big earthquake in the United States that will prevent me from going and meet with the President?” [unclear] And of course I would go, and, well, that made a big hit with them.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Brezhnev: So, and—well, for the first time, as I say, that I spoke to a group of Americans about my paying my respect for you was with this group of Senators, and I really spoke from my heart. And the second time was during my interview with the biggest group of American correspondents that I’ve ever received. There were eleven of them.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Brezhnev: And I—in fact, I can—I spent a lot of time with them. Ican send you a full transcript of my discussion and my interview with them. And in that conversation I—twice in different sorts of settings and different circumstances I mentioned and emphasized what I see as the role and the significance of President Nixon and his policies in the—in changing relationships and improving relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States. But you know, come to think of it, 12 or so years ago one former very—formerly very prominent Soviet diplomat and statesman told me that, “Now you”—and I was then—“you are just a sort of a newly-initiated statesman. You’re an up-and-coming statesman,” he said to me—

Nixon: Yes.

Brezhnev: —at that time, and—

Nixon: Absolutely.