Superpower Relations,
Backchannels, and the Subcontinent: Using the Nixon Tapes to
Examine the 1971 India-Pakistan War
Ehrlichman: And the India-Pakistan thing in that larger canvas
is really not understood by the average guy to be all that
important. It’s a bunch of—
Nixon: Unwashed heathen. They’re picking away at each other over
there.
Ehrlichman: Either side would have been the wrong side.1
—December 24, 1971
Kissinger: Mr. President, by next October people will say: “What
India-Pakistan crisis?”...When the history is written, this will
look like one of our better maneuvers.2
—March 31, 1972
In his 1978 memoir, President Richard M. Nixon claimed, “By
using diplomatic signals and behind-the-scenes pressures we had
been able to save West Pakistan from the imminent threat of
Indian aggression and domination. We had also once again avoided
a major confrontation with the Soviet Union.”3 Kissinger’s far
more detailed chapter on “the tilt,” in the first volume of his
memoirs, White House Years, complements and largely
corroborates Nixon’s.4 Kissinger argued that Nixon did not want
to “squeeze” Pakistani President Agha “Yahya” Khan, and tried to
put forward a neutral posture to the bloodshed in East Pakistan
that was initially triggered by a series of natural disasters.5
Kissinger also contended that Nixon did not want to encourage
secessionist elements within an ally, Pakistan, which was
divided into two wings—East and West—over 1,000 miles apart
astride its hostile neighbor, India. Above all, before his
secret trip to China in July 1971, Kissinger wanted to preserve
the special channel to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and
he saw three obstacles to handling the situation in South Asia:
“the policy of India, our own public debate, and the
indiscipline of our bureaucracy.”6 Kissinger stressed that the
US attempted to restrain India by making clear American
opposition to Indo-Pakistani conflict and attempting to enlist
Soviet assistance with their ally, India, towards the same goal.
Nevertheless, the two South Asian countries marched towards
conflict following a cyclone in November 1970, the resulting
devastation and flooding in East Pakistan, Yahya’s election loss
to pro-Bangladeshi independence politician Mujib Rahman in
December 1970, and Yahya’s subsequent crackdown of “Operation
Searchlight” in East Pakistan against Bangladeshi independence
in March 1971. The environmental and political upheaval caused
an unprecedented refugee crisis as Bengalis fled from East
Pakistan into India and, with Indian backing, organized an
independent government-in-exile and resistance movement.
The August 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
on the heels of Kissinger’s groundbreaking trip to China was, in
Kissinger’s view, a particular cause for alarm because it “was
deliberately steering nonaligned India toward a de facto
alliance with the Soviet Union” and enabled India to take an
uncompromising stance against the instability in Pakistan.7
Kissinger faulted Indian intransigence, interference in East
Pakistan, and a refusal to negotiate on substantive matters,
rather than Pakistani provocations, as the precipitating causes
of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Kissinger also believed the
crisis had been solved at the edge of an abyss by the various
messages sent through confidential channels (including the White
House-Kremlin “Hot Line”) and diplomatic channels to the Soviet
Union, which allegedly led to the Indian acceptance of a
ceasefire and the preservation of West Pakistan at Soviet
behest. Kissinger maintained that Indian restraint on attacking
West Pakistan was, in no doubt, due to “a reluctant decision
resulting from Soviet pressure, which in turn grew out of
American insistence, including the fleet movement and the
willingness to risk the [May 1972 Moscow] summit.”8
In the face of the President’s and National Security Advisor’s
memoirs, however, nearly every other account of the US response
to the South Asian crisis has faulted the Nixon administration
for its handling of the crisis, for its “tilt” to the
dictatorial and arguably genocidal regime of Yahya Khan, its
anti-Indian bias, its distorted reading of intelligence, and its
claim that the US “saved” West Pakistan by challenging India and
the Soviet Union. Critics have further charged that Nixon acted
recklessly by sending Task Force 74, a flotilla led by the
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, to the
Indian Ocean at the height of the war, thereby exacerbating
tensions and risking broader conflict between competing
alliances: India and the Soviet Union on one side; the US, the
PRC, and Pakistan on the other.9
The charges levied by critics trace their origin to
investigative journalist Jack Anderson’s Pulitzer-Prize-winning
syndicated columns in December 1971 - January 1972 that
documented the Nixon administration’s “tilt” towards Pakistan.
Anderson’s exposé was based on a selection of sensitive, high
level, leaked documents he had obtained from the executive
branch and the military. The most damaging sources Anderson
obtained came from the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG),
the National Security Council-based policy body that addressed
the South Asian crisis. In his 1973 book, The Anderson Papers,
which further expanded the critique of the Nixon-Kissinger South
Asia policy, the journalist charged, “Richard Nixon brought the
United States to the edge of another world war. His actions were
deliberate; he operated in secret; and he lied to the American
people about his actions.”10
Those critical of Nixon’s policy have dominated the
historiography of the episode on the Subcontinent and have
largely followed Anderson’s groundbreaking work, adding new
insights based on documentary evidence as it became available
over the last four decades. The critics range from ex-State
Department officials, such as Christopher Van Hollen and William
Bundy, to memoirists, like former Soviet Ambassador to the US
Anatoly Dobrynin and Indian Foreign Secretary T. N. Kaul, to
journalists, biographers, and historians. Kissinger-biographers
number among the critics and include investigative reporter
Seymour Hersh, Time magazine editor Walter Isaacson, and
Finnish scholar Jussi Hanhimäki. Perhaps the best sourced
examination focusing on the South Asian episode is the work of
historian Robert McMahon, who has based his scholarship on
excellent edited volumes produced by F. S. Aijazuddin and Roedad
Khan, in addition to two volumes of official documentary series
Foreign Relations of the United States produced by the
State Department.11
Yet, despite the preponderance of rich documentary sources,
there is still material that has been hitherto untapped. To
bridge the gap between the Nixon administration’s perceptions
and policy responses to the South Asian crisis and war of 1971,
this article uses Nixon tapes material that has never been
published, in addition to the recently declassified high level
US-Soviet “backchannel” exchanges. The tapes provide the candid
assessments by Nixon, Kissinger and other policymakers as events
were reported across the executive offices, with moments of
excitement, disappointment, and a range of emotions expressed in
raw, uncensored language.12 In contrast to the unpolished nature
of the tapes, the published US and Soviet backchannel exchanges
show the direct, written communications between the White House
and the Kremlin in the lead-up to and during the short
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Soon after Nixon assumed office in
1969, Kissinger, on the President’s behalf, met privately with
the Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin, and conducted
a candid exchange of views that grew to encompass all major
issues in superpower relations over the following years. The US
Department of State and the Russian Foreign Ministry jointly
compiled, translated, annotated, and published nearly the entire
record—over one thousand pages—in US-Soviet Relations in the
Era of Détente, 1969-1972. This unique collection provides
an invaluable snapshot into these important meetings between US
and Soviet interlocutors, a record that was long shrouded in
secrecy.13
Utilizing these new materials, we argue that the Nixon
administration’s handling of the crisis on the Subcontinent was
neither the abject failure as depicted by critics, nor was it
the success that Nixon and Kissinger presented in their memoirs.
In fact, this article reaches conclusions midway between the
administration and its critics. The picture of the White House
response to the crisis reveals that although Nixon and Kissinger
superimposed a Cold War distortion on a regional situation, they
responded logically. The Nixon administration steadily escalated
diplomatic signals and the top policymakers sincerely believed
that India had launched external aggression—not Pakistan—with
its support for Mukthi Bahini (liberation force) raids into what
was then East Pakistan.
Several additional themes run through the narrative of this
article, many of which were also reflected in US-Soviet
backchannel communications and in the taped conversations. Not
surprisingly, Nixon and Kissinger’s policy perceptions were
clearly colored by their personal experiences with Indira Gandhi
and Yahya Khan. The White House was unwilling to dismiss Yahya’s
role as an honest broker in Sino-American rapprochement and
likewise saw duplicity on the part of Indira Gandhi after she
visited Washington, DC in early November 1971 and claimed that
India had no desire for war with Pakistan. Additionally, the
surreptitiously recorded conversations between the President and
his advisers, a portion of the 3,700-hour collection of Nixon
tapes, are rife with gendered speech and appeals to masculine
“toughness” that colored Nixon’s actions. Significantly, the
frequent contact with the Soviets during the war mitigates some
of the criticism of recklessness.
The tapes and communications with the Soviets also demonstrate
that Nixon and Kissinger believed that the war started on
November 21, 1971, in contrast to the date most often cited as
the start of the war, December 3, 1971, when Pakistan attacked
forward Indian airbases. The tapes and backchannel records show
that Nixon and Kissinger certainly believed in November-December
1971 that an Indian attack could result in the “dismemberment”
and Balkanization of West Pakistan, regardless if the impression
came from a misreading of intelligence. The Nixon administration
attempted to spin the stories on the war to downplay American
involvement on Pakistan’s behalf, and due to the reliance on
backchannel diplomacy, it is understandable that the
administration’s actions were criticized at the time and
afterwards for the dichotomy between the public and private
lines. Lastly, the experience of the Nixon White House during
the South Asian crisis reinforced the belief in the White House
that the Soviets would attempt to gain at American expense and
that the administration would need to take a hard line to bring
the Soviets into line.
Unfortunately, the focus on the US and Soviet materials is
illuminating but cannot comprehensively address the multifaceted
1971 South Asian crisis and war because the situation on the
ground outpaced Washington’s and Moscow’s efforts to manage the
crisis at the time. Until high level Indian materials,
Indo-Soviet exchanges, Soviet Politburo meetings and other
sources become available—if ever—the Pakistani, Soviet, and
Indian sides of the story will remain incomplete. In the
interim, a more nuanced understanding of US policy will need to
suffice.
Backchannels and the Indo-Pakistani War
The Indo-Pakistani war was the quintessential example of a
regional conflict projected onto the backdrop of perceived
superpower conflict and foreign policy managed from the White
House. Nixon and Kissinger directed policy during the crisis but
used the State Department to send messages through official
channels and to build a public relations case for action in the
UN.14 The policies partially grew out of inherent distrust for
the “bureaucracy” at the State Department, but Nixon and
Kissinger still relied on higher level Department officials,
such as Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs
Joseph Sisco. Although the US response was more complex than
either supporters or detractors have argued, it is clear that
the administration used backchannels to convey their desire to
use Soviet influence to contain the Indians and to contain the
potential risks of the regional conflict expanding into a
superpower conflict due to entangling alliances and obligations.
The White House initially believed that India wanted to avoid
conflict and argued for several months that the US and the
Soviet Union had “parallel interests” in trying to prevent an
Indo-Pakistani war. At the same time, American policymakers
realistically recognized that a refugee crisis could be the
first step down the road to conflict.15 The theme of “parallel
interests” also entered into the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel.
For example, at Nixon’s request, Kissinger invited Dobrynin to
the presidential retreat at Camp David on June 10, 1971, for a
tour d’horizon of US-Soviet relations.16 Dobrynin
reported back to Moscow that, with regard to the brewing
Indo-Pakistani crisis, Kissinger claimed that Washington had
“reliable information” that India “has still not rejected the
idea of providing armed assistance to East Pakistan.”17
Before departing on his secret trip to China, Kissinger informed
Dobrynin that he had been instructed by President Nixon to
“visit Delhi and confidentially, but in the strongest terms,
call Indira Gandhi’s attention to the fact that the US takes a
very serious view of this dangerous Indian course of action and
the serious consequences associated with it.” In the event of an
Indo-Pakistani war, Kissinger warned that the US would “cut off
all future economic aid to India.” Dobrynin reported back to the
Kremlin: “In short, Kissinger summarized, the US Government is
for maintaining the territorial status quo between India and
Pakistan while at the same time seeking a political solution to
the problems that have arisen.” Once again, Kissinger had
stressed the parallel interests of the US and the USSR, and
“made it clear that the President [considered] the confidential
exchange of views on this matter between him and the Soviet
leadership to be useful,” and it would “revisit this issue”
after Kissinger’s return from Asia.18
In response to the US opening to China, announced by President
Nixon in a nationwide televised address on July 15, 1971, India
took the diplomatic initiative by tilting toward the Soviet
Union, taking out an insurance policy of sorts. Dusting off a
treaty that had been negotiated but never concluded, Indian
Ambassador to the USSR and close associate of Indira Gandhi, D.
P. Dhar, traveled to Moscow in late July 1971 and quickly
concluded the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and
Cooperation on August 9th.19 This development signified the
first shift in the Soviet position on the crisis away from
US-Soviet “parallel interests.” Indo-Soviet collusion expanded
and was, perhaps, an unintended consequence of US geopolitical
paradigm shift towards China, in addition to being a brilliant
Indian Realpolitik counterpunch to the Pakistani channels
Nixon and Kissinger had used to open China.
On the morning of August 9, 1971, Kissinger informed the
President about the Indo-Soviet treaty. Nixon inadvertently
raised the subject by noting from his morning news summary that
he had seen that “Gromyko was down there talking to that damned
Indian Foreign Minister [Swaran Singh].” Kissinger replied that
the Soviet Union and India had just signed the 25-year treaty
and explained that the Indians and the Soviets would “consult
with each other in case of aggression of other countries against
one of the parties.” Talking with a sense of bravado, Kissinger
promised, “to give that Indian Ambassador [to the US, L.K. Jha]
unshirted hell.” Audibly angry, Nixon replied, “And the thing
is, though, they [the Indians] should well understand if they’re
going to choose to go with the Russians, they’re choosing not to
go with us.” The President added, “Now, Goddamnit, they’ve got
to know this...Goddamnit, who’s giving them a billion dollars a
year? Shit, the Russians aren’t giving them a billion dollars a
year, Henry.” Kissinger suggested that the response to India and
the Soviet Union be handled in the National Security Council,
i.e. from the White House and via private channels:
Kissinger: Bureaucratically I am going—we have to keep this in
the NSC system because—
Nixon: Hell yes.
Kissinger: —while the combination of Bill [Rogers] and [Joe]
Sisco is going to be hip-shooting all over the place if they do
it alone, and all on the Indian side because they’re very
influenced, as you know, by The Washing-ton Post and
New York Times. So far—
Nixon: [Sighs]
Kissinger: —I’ve—Bill has, has been fine. But now that Sisco is
back—
Nixon: He’s going up to New York, is he?
Kissinger: Yeah. Well, I don’t mind. I think it’s good for him
to do the relief—
Nixon: That’s on the refugees—
Kissinger: As long it’s relief, but all the briefing papers he
gets—Every time he listens to his own bureaucracy, he’s in
trouble because all of them are pro-Indian, all of them are—are
really Kennedyites…20
As the conversation progressed, Kissinger elucidated the
practice of triangular diplomacy and directly linked the policy
of improved relations with the Soviet Union through a potential
summit meeting to the US opening to China, the simmering
Arab-Israeli dispute, and the situation on the Subcontinent.
Kissinger believed that the fear of Sino-American collusion
would keep the Soviets in line, and the prospect of a summit
meeting and the concurrent agreements that would be signed in
Moscow could help delay another war in the Middle East and force
the Soviets to restrain the Indians and avert war on the
Subcontinent:
Kissinger: But their major reason is they’re afraid of what you
will do in Peking if they’re in a posture of hostility to you.
So they would like to have the visit hanging over Peking. They
would like that you have the visit in the pocket—
Nixon: I see.
Kissinger: So that you will not—So that you will be restrained
in Peking. We, in turn, want it because it’s helpful to us to
have Moscow hanging over Peking. It reinsures…the Peking visit.
And, after all, when I handed your letter to Dobrynin, I didn’t
even mention the summit. He said, “Does the fact that there is
no summit in there mean the President has lost interest?” He
said, “Because I can tell you unofficially they are considering
it now at the highest level in Moscow and there’ll be an
answer.” And he said…speaking for himself—“they’re not letting
me go on vacation is because they want me to transmit that
answer, that proposal.”
Nixon: Hmm. Well, either way, we shall see.
Kissinger: …And for us…then we’d be in great shape. Because if
the summit is coming up, say, in the middle of May [1972] in
Moscow, we’d know there won’t be a Middle East blowup before
then, because they’ll sit on the Egyptians. Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: That and India is—are the two big problems.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: That means we’ll be through the better part of next
year, and they can’t start something up right after the summit,
either.
Nixon: Hmm.
Kissinger: And we can keep the two to control each other.21
When Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited Washington
in early September, the situation in South Asia was discussed
within the broader context of superpower relations.22 Nixon told
Gromyko that he feared the situation in the Subcontinent could
“explode into war in the area.” Gromyko responded that the
Soviet Government also wanted to “prevent a confrontation” and
that Moscow had shared its policy with Mrs. Gandhi. Despite New
Delhi’s protestations to the Kremlin that it wanted to avoid
war, Gromyko noted that the Soviet leadership “did not have as
much confidence as in the case of the Indian leadership.”
Furthermore, Gromyko “was gratified to know” that Soviet and US
policies in averting war were in line and that both “stood on
the position of counseling both sides to exercise restraint.”
Nixon told the Soviet Foreign Minister that the two would “be in
touch with each other on this situation.”23 Nixon also reminded
Gromyko of the importance of using the backchannel: “I do not
take charge of things that don’t matter. Where they matter, like
between our countries, then I make the decisions.” The President
emphasized, “We couldn’t have done it without that channel.”24
By late October, as a result of the Indo-Soviet treaty and
several high-level trips between Soviet and Indian diplomatic,
political, and military officials, Soviet attitudes began to
change from agreement with American pronouncements about
restraint and averting war towards a sharper criticism of
Pakistani actions. As two scholars of the Indo-Pakistani
conflict have noted, “the total shift in Moscow’s position on
‘Bangladesh’ occurred only after Mrs. Gandhi’s visit to Moscow
from 27 to 29 September.”25 The change in Soviet attitude did
not go unnoticed in American policymaking circles and entered
into the various US-Soviet channels amidst multifaceted
discussions of summit planning, the Middle East, trade, and
other areas of US-Soviet relations. The White House increasingly
saw the Soviet Union as an enabler of Indian aggression, a
pattern that also fit with the perceptions of the Soviet Union
enabling North Vietnamese intransigence by supplying materiel.
As the pattern became clear, Nixon and Kissinger felt that the
US would have to risk détente, and mild protests gave way to
vigorous protests that the Soviet response to American wishes
during the Indo-Pakistani war could be a “watershed” in
US-Soviet relations.
At the beginning of November, Indira Gandhi visited Washington
to press India’s case and explain the dire nature of the refugee
crisis. Presidential scholar Robert Dallek correctly called the
“two conversations on November 4 and 5…case studies in heads of
state speaking past each other.”26 It is more likely, however,
that Nixon and Gandhi had already made up their minds long
before they met in the Oval Office that autumn. Nixon believed
that India wanted to confront Pakistan and underlined the
potential consequences: American aid to India would be cut off,
and the American people would not understand aggressive action.
Gandhi knew that Nixon would not take India’s side and had
already calculated that the consequences would short-lived.27
The November 4th conversation featured Kissinger doing most of
the talking, while the conversation on November 5th was one of
Nixon’s foreign policy assessments, with Kissinger adding some
important details on Southeast Asia, and, particularly, the
Peking initiative to assuage Indian concerns.28
Most accounts of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, particularly those
which have examined the American response, have either ignored
or downplayed the events of late-November 1971 and have dated
the start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 to the Pakistani Air
Force’s December 3, 1971, raid on airbases in northwestern
India.29 The perception that India was going to go to war
against Pakistan was fairly well established in the wake of
Gandhi’s trip to Washington, nearly a month before Yahya
commenced the air raid. American policymakers were kept well
apprised of events on the ground by their connections to the
Pakistani leadership and knew of Mukti Bahini attacks into East
Pakistan with the support of regular Indian armor, artillery,
and infantry.30 Kissinger-biographer Walter Isaacson wrote, “On
November 22, when India conducted a cross-border operation into
East Pakistan in support of Bengali separatists, Kissinger was
one of the few (then or in retrospect) who considered this
incident the start of full-scale war.” Isaacson continued, “The
State Department, on the other hand, downplayed the seriousness
of these skirmishes; even Pakistan’s President Yahya Khan cabled
the next day to say he still hoped a war could be avoided.”31
Although the point about “full scale” war may be accurate, the
broader argument missed several important factors, including:
the State Department was receiving contradictory reports from
both Pakistan and India; as demonstrated in several secretly
taped conversations, Nixon and Kissinger genuinely believed that
India had started the war by supporting Mukti Bahini forces with
regular Indian troops on Pakistani territory; and, most
importantly, the simple fact of the situation on the ground was
that Indian regular forces had violated Pakistan’s border in
support of insurgents who were both trained and supplied by
India. As Richard Sisson and Leo Rose noted in their landmark
study on the conflict, published before Isaacson’s biography of
Kissinger, “because of the air strikes, Pakistan is often
depicted as having taken the initiative in starting the war. In
more realistic, rather than formal, terms, however, the war
began on 21 November, when Indian military units occupied
Pakistani territory as part of the preliminary phase to the
offensive directed at capturing and liberating Dhaka.”32
As reports of the number and severity of border skirmishes
increased, Kissinger convened the interagency WSAG to develop a
response. Kissinger’s planned response of going to the UN—minus
the factor of the US-Soviet backchannels, which was unbeknownst
to most of the group’s members—developed largely out of the
assessment by the State Department’s Joseph Sisco. Sisco told
Kissinger:
In the present circumstances, where we do not have an all-out
war but do have a significant increase in the numbers of
incidents, we could try to get some form of restraining order
from the Security Council which hopefully would arrest or slow
down further deterioration of the situation…We obviously need
facts. But I think we know enough about the nature of the
insurgency to believe it would be a good thing to begin to move
our efforts somewhat more into the public domain and to begin to
place some of the responsibility on the shoulders of the UN.33
On November 22, 1971, American policymakers certainly believed
that there had been a major incident and that India had attacked
Pakistan by Mukti Bahini proxy. Kissinger called Nixon at 12:45
p.m. and said, “There is no doubt there is a large encroachment
taking place and it is heavily backed by the Indians.”34 In a
memo later that day, Kissinger relayed Pakistani radio
broadcasts of an Indian offensive and added, “we have no
independent evidence but it seems apparent that there has been a
major incident.”35 In a never-before-published transcript of
Oval Office meeting with the President that afternoon, after
continued reports were coming in through regular cable traffic
and via backchannels, Kissinger answered Nixon’s queries about
the situation on the Subcontinent:
Nixon: Is Yahya saying it’s war or not?
Kissinger: Yeah, they’re saying it’s war.
Nixon: And the Indians say it isn’t?
Kissinger: It isn’t. That’s right. It’s a naked case of
aggression, Mr. President...
Nixon: Goddamnit, maybe we ought to say that.
Kissinger still hoped that war could be averted, despite the
‘naked case of Indian aggression,’ but the threshold had been
crossed. As an overall strategy, Kissinger endorsed the idea of
coordinated action with the PRC in the UN Security Council.
Kissinger suggested: “we ought to talk to—which I’ll do tomorrow
night36—to the Chinese to find out what they’ll do at the
Security Council…we don’t have to go as far as the Chinese, but
I would lean—” Nixon interrupted: “I want to go damn near as
far. Now, understand: I don’t like the Indians.” Kissinger
responded, “We ought to lean pretty close to the Chinese and
make it an international [action]” but was again interrupted.
Nixon repeated his theme: “Let’s remember the Pakistanis have
been our friends…and the damn Indians have not been. You
know?”37 Kissinger hoped to coordinate with the Chinese and
other powers in order to diplomatically isolate India and its
Soviet Bloc supporters.
At Kissinger’s suggestion and with Nixon’s approval, the State
Department sent a demarche to PM Gandhi on November 27th. To the
Indians, the note said, “Military engagements along India’s
border with East Pakistan have increased in number and strength.
Tanks, aircraft and regular forces have been involved on both
sides.”38 The message to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was
similar and explicit: “The recent border incidents…in the
Jessore section of East Pakistan have been of particular concern
to me, as I am sure they have been to you…there appears to be an
imminent danger of full-scale hostilities between India and
Pakistan.”39 Despite the Nixon administration’s best efforts to
deescalate the situation, decisions in New Delhi and Islamabad
had been made and the war was a foregone conclusion by late
November. India had thrown down the gauntlet, and the fatalistic
Pakistani leader decided to pick it up with a bungled attempt to
take out Indian forward airbases on December 3rd.40
Nixon and Kissinger decided to fight the battle in the UN, in
allegiance with Communist China, and to make the Indo-Pakistani
war a litmus test in US-Soviet relations. Kissinger and,
particularly, Nixon were disinclined to believe the Indian side
of the story and instead trusted the Pakistanis. From the
vantage point of the Oval Office, Yahya had served as an honest
broker in opening China and had accepted American
recommendations for a peaceful resolution of the crisis—despite,
as they saw them, exaggerated reports of his domestic strong-arm
tactics. Nixon and Kissinger, at the same time, believed that
Gandhi had moved away from two decades of Indian non-alignment
and had allied the world’s most populous democracy with the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, they believed she had lied to them
during her trip to Washington. For the Nixon White House, the
unanswered questions included the status of West Pakistan and
whether or not it would be Balkanized, the fate of Kashmir, and
whether or not East Pakistan would gain independence, become
part of India, or some combination thereof.
Kissinger called Nixon on the morning of December 3rd to inform
him “that West Pakistan has attacked because situation in East
collapsing.” As for the Pakistani attack on India, Nixon saw it
akin to “Russia claiming to be attacked by Finland.”41
Immediately responding to the news, Kissinger convened an
emergency meeting of the WSAG.42 CIA Director Richard Helms
confirmed that the Pakistanis had attacked the Indians, an act,
the group largely agreed, likely provoked by Indian actions over
the preceding two weeks, although confirming intelligence was
not available.43
Despite the onset of hostilities, the US-Soviet backchannel
dialogue on the war itself, handled via Soviet chargé
d’affairs Yuly Vorontsov (since Dobrynin had been recalled
to Moscow for instructions), did not commence in earnest until
the afternoon of December 5, 1971. Kissinger informed the
President that the American efforts for a ceasefire and
withdrawal had the support of the Chinese, and only Russia and
Poland had opposed the efforts. Kissinger was displeased with
the Soviet behavior and told Nixon, “Now, what the Russians this
morning have launched is a blistering attack on Pakistan in TASS
and in effect, have warned China against getting involved. What
we are seeing here is a Soviet-Indian power play to humiliate
the Chinese and also somewhat us.” If the US failed to support
Pakistan, Kissinger warned, “if we collapse now, the Soviets
won’t respect us for it; the Chinese will despise us and the
other countries will draw their conclusions.”44
Kissinger then directed NSC staffer Helmut Sonnenfeldt to draft
a telegram and ordered Haig to prepare talking points according
to the President’s telephone instructions, in preparation for a
meeting with Vorontsov at 4:00 p.m. on December 5th. As
scheduled, Kissinger met with Vorontsov in the Map Room at the
White House. Kissinger told the DCM that “A letter for the
General Secretary would be delivered the next day, but in view
of the urgency of the situation, the President wanted it
transmitted to Moscow immediately.” At a time of improving
relations, Kissinger continued, “The President did not
understand how the Soviet Union could believe that it was
possible to work on the broad amelioration of our relationships
while at the same time encouraging the Indian military
aggression against Pakistan.” The President believed that Indian
‘aggression’ in instigating armed conflict with Pakistan
violated the established order and the UN charter, and wondered
why “a member country of the United Nations was being
dismembered by the military forces of another member country
which had close relationships with the Soviet Union.”45
The next day, Kissinger had Nixon’s formal letter delivered to
Vorontsov at the Soviet Embassy, but not via “usual channels.”46
Still hoping to move from confrontation to cooperation, Nixon
wrote Brezhnev that it was his understanding from his September
meeting with Gromyko that the US and Soviet Union were “entering
a new period in our relations which would be marked by mutual
restraint and in which neither you nor we would act in crises to
seek unilateral advantages.” Soviet support of “the Indian
Government’s open use of force against the independence and
integrity of Pakistan, merely serves to aggravate an already
grave situation,” Nixon warned. The only solution, in the
president’s determination, was that “Urgent action is required
and I believe that your great influence in New Delhi should
serve these ends.”47
Vorontsov met with Kissinger at 11:00 p.m. to personally deliver
Brezhnev’s equally firm reply. According to Vorontsov, Brezhnev
argued that the root cause of the conflict was the “result of
actions of the Pakistani government against the population of
East Pakistan” and that the Soviet Union desired “a political
settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the will
of its population as clearly expressed in the December 1970
elections.” In Brezhnev’s mind, the US did not act “actively
enough and precisely enough…towards removing the main source of
tension in relations between Pakistan and India.” Brezhnev
vigorously disputed Nixon’s argument that the India-Pakistan
crisis would be a watershed in US-Soviet relations:
Differences in the appraisal of specific events in the world…may
arise, and there is nothing unnatural in that. However, if in
such cases, instead of business-like search for realistic
solutions, to start talking about a “critical stage” or
“watershed” in Soviet-American relations, it would hardly help
finding such solutions, and would make it still harder to
envisage that it will facilitate improvement of Soviet-American
relations and their stability.48
In the face of Soviet pushback, Nixon took an even harder line
with the Soviets and used additional signals, some public and
some private, to reiterate the importance of preserving West
Pakistan. To increase pressure on India and demonstrate to the
Soviet Union that the US was serious about West Pakistan, Nixon
authorized the movement of the USS Enterprise task force
to the Bay of Bengal, and reiterated to Vorontsov—through
Haig—that the White House expected a written reply to Nixon’s
letter of December 6th. Furthermore, Nixon and Kissinger called
in the Soviet Agriculture Minister, Vladimir Matskevich—then
visiting Washington—to the Oval Office to convey to the Soviet
leadership the seriousness with which American policymakers
viewed the Indo-Pakistani war. Clearly informed by the memory of
the Jordanian crisis of September 1970, both Nixon and Kissinger
wanted to play it tough with the Soviets on India-Pakistan and
save West Pakistan from dismemberment.49 Both men also
determined that forcing a change in Soviet behavior was worth
risking the summit and even the backchannel itself.
In a brief afternoon discussion on December 6th about cutting
off aid to India, Kissinger raised the late night meeting the
previous evening and the receipt of the Soviet oral note from
Vorontsov. He explained, “I really read the riot act to
him…about Soviet participation. And we’re sending a note that
you dictated today over to…Brezhnev.” Nixon blurted out, “I
don’t know whether it’ll do any good. Goddamn them, they haven’t
done anything yet…!” Alluding to the Jordanian and Cienfuegos
crises a year earlier, Kissinger exclaimed, “My worry is, Mr.
President, that…we may get into a summer 1970 situation if we
don’t show some firmness with them, now. Every time we’ve been
tough with them, they’ve backed off.”50 The theme of playing it
tough with the Russians clearly appealed to Nixon, who also
counseled Kissinger to stay the course in the UN and to work
with the Chinese. “Let’s not separate from the Chinese at the
UN,” he told Kissinger, “That I will not do.” Kissinger agreed.
Kissinger again appealed to Nixon’s sense of bravado: “It’s a
daring game, but we’ve always done well with the daring games.”
Nixon saw a Chinese feinting maneuver as a good strategy, and,
with US backing, the Soviets would not dare to attack China:
“It’s a daring game, so, with the [US backing the] Chinese—[are]
the Russians are going to attack China? Are you kidding?”51
To convey the message to the Soviets that Nixon expected a
formal response to his letter of December 6, Kissinger had Haig
call Vorontsov at 3:50 p.m. on December 8. Haig dutifully told
the Soviet chargé that Kissinger “wanted you to have this
message as soon as possible.” In a direct rebuke to the Soviet
oral response, Haig read, “the President does not feel a
response at this time is necessary until he receives a response
to his written communication, and he wanted it understood that
the ‘watershed’ term which he used was very, very pertinent, and
he considers it a carefully thought-out and valid assessment on
his part.”52 While Haig was communicating with Vorontsov, Nixon
met with Henry Kissinger at the President’s hideaway office in
the Executive Office Building. Kissinger candidly assessed the
sequence of events and determined that it was an earlier failure
not to act toughly with Mrs. Gandhi and the Russians that
allowed the war to commence: “The mistake was that we should
have understood that she [PM Gandhi] was not looking for
pretext; that she was determined to go. And secondly, we should
have been much tougher with the Russians.” Nixon asked, “Well,
what could we have done?” Kissinger explained:
We should have told them what we finally told them last Sunday
[December 5, 1971] that this would mark a watershed in our
relationship, that there could be no Middle East negotiations if
this thing would grow. We would have had to play it tough. And
thirdly, we should have, once the cat was among the pigeons,
when they moved on November 22, we had cut [aid] off, as you
wanted, but we couldn’t get the bureaucracy to do. We could have
cut off economic aid the first or second day, plus all of arms
instead of waiting ten days and diddling around.53
Vorontsov arrived at the White House on the morning of December
9th to deliver a letter from General Secretary Brezhnev to
President Nixon. The Soviet leader placed the blame on the
doorstep of Pakistan, for it was Yahya’s crackdown in East
Pakistan in spite of the December 1970 elections that had caused
the exodus of refugees to India and had provided the spark to
the proverbial fuse. Echoing American demands for a
ceasefire—but not the withdrawal of Indian forces from East
Pakistan—followed by a political settlement, Brezhnev stressed
that a ceasefire would serve as a practical first step towards
negotiation. Brezhnev asked that the US use its influence on
Yahya to achieve that end and asked Nixon for a “calm and
balanced approach.”54 If Brezhnev had hoped for a “calm and
balanced approach,” he was likely upset by Vorontsov’s extremely
urgent cable to the Soviet Foreign Ministry reporting a meeting
with Kissinger when the chargé delivered Brezhnev’s letter:
Kissinger said, as if speaking on his own behalf, that if India
turns all its troops against West Pakistan “in the wake of East
Pakistan” and tries “to secure a complete victory” over
Pakistan, then the United States (“unlike our conduct with
regard to events in East Pakistan, where the situation is rather
complex and politically complicated”) would prevent a crushing
defeat of Pakistan in that case, and to that end would even be
willing to undertake steps of a military nature: “The Indians
must not forget that the US has allied commitments with respect
to defending Pakistan from aggression.”55
Nixon took a hard line position when he received Soviet
Agriculture Minister, Vladimir Matskevich, at the White House at
4 p.m. on December 9, 1971.56 After a friendly introduction in
which he recalled an earlier encounter in Moscow in 1959, the
President pleaded with Matskevich: “I believe that you as one
who is very close to the Chairman, and, of course, you as your
top ranking representative…I want you to know how strongly I
feel personally about this issue, and it may be that as a result
of this conversation you could convey to Chairman Brezhnev a
sense of urgency that may lead to a settlement.”57 Intending
that his guest serve as a oneway channel to pass along the
ominous implications of an Indian attack on West Pakistan
directly to Brezhnev, Nixon warned Matskevich:
The first requirement is a ceasefire. The second requirement is
that India desist from attacks in West Pakistan. If India moves
forces against West Pakistan, the United States cannot stand by.
The key to the settlement is in the hands of the Soviet Union.
If the USSR does not restrain the Indians, the US will not be
able to deal with Yahya. If the Indians continue their military
operations, we must inevitably look toward a confrontation
between the Soviet Union and the United States.58
Reviewing the meeting with the following day, Kissinger assured
Nixon that the message that the US would protect West Pakistan
would reach the Soviet leadership. The following exchange is
particularly telling for Nixon’s perception of the Indians and a
sense that the Soviets were pulling the Indian marionette
strings:
Nixon: But these Indians are cowards. Right?
Kissinger: Right, but with Russian backing. You see, the
Russians have sent notes to Iran, Turkey, to a lot of countries
threatening them.59 The Russians have played a miserable game.
Nixon: So we’ll do the same thing, right?
Kissinger: Exactly.
Nixon: Threatening them with what? If they come in and what?
Kissinger: They’ll do something. They haven’t said what they’ll
do. But they’ll settle now. After your conversation with
Matskevich yesterday, they’re going to settle.60
Kissinger met with Vorontsov on the morning of December 10, and
delivered a terse letter
from Nixon to Brezhnev asserting that Brezhnev’s proposals
“concerning the political evolution of East Pakistan appear to
be met,” but that it would need to be followed by “an immediate
cease-fire in the West.”61 Kissinger allowed Vorontsov to copy
the verbatim text of an aide-memoire from November 5,
1962, between then Pakistani leader Ayub Khan and US Ambassador
McConaughy, in which the Kennedy administration reaffirmed
previous assurances to “come to Pakistan’s assistance in the
event of aggression from India against Pakistan.”62 As Nixon
warned in his letter, if a ceasefire in the West did not take
place immediately, the US “would have to conclude that there is
in progress an act of aggression directed at the whole of
Pakistan, a friendly country toward which we have obligations.”
Nixon continued to urge the Soviets “in the strongest terms to
restrain India “from looking westward.”63
In New York on the evening of December 11th, Kissinger secretly
met with Huang Hua, the PRC Permanent Representative to the UN
and ambassador to Canada to coordinate Sino-American activities
about the Indo-Pakistani War. Kissinger told Huang,
“Incidentally, just so everyone knows exactly what we do, we
tell you about our conversations with Soviets; we do not tell
the Soviets about our conversations with you.” Kissinger then
raised a matter “of some sensitivity.” The US would share
information with the Chinese about “Soviet dispositions on your
borders” and, vaguely, “if the People’s Republic were to
consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a threat to
its security, and if it took measures to protect its security,
the US would oppose efforts of others to interfere with the
People’s Republic.”64
Kissinger called Vorontsov on the afternoon of the 11th to
inform the Soviets that the US would “proceed unilaterally,”
presumably at the United Nations, if it did not hear from the
Soviet leadership. Vorontsov informed Kissinger that Moscow had
dispatched the First Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Vasily V. Kuznetsov, to India “in direct connection to whatever
we have discussed here.”65 Nixon and Kissinger worried aloud
that an Indian attack on West Pakistan might provoke Chinese
action in support of Pakistan against India, which, in turn,
could escalate even further if the Soviets moved against China
to support India. Nixon believed it would be “crystal clear,”
“naked aggression” if India continued military action after East
Pakistan was “wrapped up.” Kissinger explained that Indian
Foreign Minister Swaran Singh had “refused to give an assurance”
that India did not “have any territorial…ambitions.” Singh had
vaguely mentioned “minor rectifications,” a codeword, in
Kissinger’s opinion, that meant Southern Kashmir. Nixon
remarked, “by God, the country [US] doesn’t give a shit [about
India-Pakistan]. That’s the point.”
President Nixon realistically assessed the situation and saw the
scenarios involving nuclear war for what they were—unlikely
contingencies:
Nixon: Are we being over anxious on the hotline? No, we’re not.
Basically, all we’re doing is asking for a reply. We’re not
letting the Russians diddle us along, point one…And, second, all
we’re doing is to reiterate what I said to the Agriculture
Minister and what you said to Vorontsov. Right?
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: Does that sound like a good plan to you?
Kissinger: It’s a ... typical Nixon plan. I mean it’s bold.
You’re putting your chips into the pot again. But my view is
that if we do nothing, there’s a certainty of a disaster.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: This way there’s a high possibility of one, but at
least we’re coming off like men.
Encouraging Chinese troop movements against India entailed
risks, but Nixon saw them as more of a means of forcing Indian
restraint in Pakistan. With US backing, a Soviet attack on China
in support of India was, in the President’s estimation,
unlikely:
Nixon: The reason that I suggested that the Chinese move is they
talked about the Soviet divisions on their border and all that
sort of thing. You know that the Soviets at this point aren’t
about to go ripping into that damn mess, having in mind the fact
of their gains from the Indian thing…
Kissinger: The Chinese, well, we asked, but that’s not the
reason they’re doing it.
Nixon: The way you put it, Henry, the way you put it is very
different as I understand. You said, “Look, we’re doing all
these things, why don’t you threaten them?” Remember I said,
“Threaten, move a couple of people.” … Look, we have to scare
these bastards…
Kissinger: My feeling is, Mr. President, leaving completely
aside what we’ve said, if the outcome of this is that Pakistan
is swallowed by India; China is destroyed, defeated, humiliated
by the Soviet Union; it will be a change in the world balance of
power of such magnitude…that the security of the United States
for—maybe forever, certainly for decades—we will have a
guaranteed war in the Middle East, then…
Nixon: The point is, the fact of the matter is I’d put [it] in
more Armageddon terms than reserves when I say that the Chinese
move and the Soviets threaten and then we start lobbing nuclear
weapons. That isn’t what happens. That isn’t what happens. What
happens is we then do have a hotline to the Soviets and we
finally just say now what goes on here?
Kissinger: We don’t have to lob nuclear weapons. We have to go
on alert.
Nixon noted that the Armageddon scenarios were, however,
hypothetical: “Well, we’re talking about a lot of ifs. Russia
and China aren’t going to go to war.” Kissinger disagreed, but
Nixon pointed out that the timing was just wrong for a world
war. The President counseled prudence: “Well, let me put it this
way. I have always felt that India and Pakistan, inevitably,
would have a war. And there can always be a war in the Mideast.
As far as Russia and China is [are] concerned there are other
factors too overwhelming at this particular point for them to go
at each other.”66
Less than two hours later, Vorontsov called Kissinger with an
“immediate reply” to the President’s message:
The first contacts with the Government of India and personally
with Prime Minister I. Gandhi…testify to the fact that the
Government of India has no intention to take any military
actions against West Pakistan. The Soviet leaders believe that
this makes the situation easier and hope that the Government of
Pakistan will draw from this appropriate conclusions. As far as
other questions raised in the President’s letter are concerned
the answers will be given in the shortest of time.
Vorontsov said he had not “been instructed to say this,” but in
his “personal capacity” he wanted Kissinger to know that Gromyko
had returned from vacation, and the Soviet Ambassador to the UN
had “been discussing with the authorities in delegation along
the lines we discussed with the President,” with “all kinds of
guarantees.”67 Vorontsov repeatedly assured Kissinger that the
US and USSR were in agreement, and that there was a chance for
cooperation.
Meanwhile, another letter from Nixon to Brezhnev went out via
the “hotline” at 11:30 a.m. The message was curt:
[A]fter delaying for 72 hours in anticipation of your [formal]
reply…I had set in train certain moves in the United Nations
Security Council…These cannot now be reversed. I must also note
that Indian assurances still lack any concreteness. I am still
prepared to proceed along the lines of set forth in my letter of
December 10, as well as in conversations with your chargé
d’affaires Vorontsov, and my talk with your Agriculture
Minister…68
The hotline message showed that the US had clearly taken a hard
line with the Soviets and reflected the White House belief that
India would attack West Pakistan—regardless of Indian or Soviet
pronouncements to the contrary. The next day, December 13, the
Soviets responded with a brief hotline message of their own,
which stated that they were conducting a “clarification of all
the circumstances in India” and that the message had been “in
accordance with the confidential exchange of opinions.”69
The Conclusion of the Indo-Pakistani War and the Radford Affair
As soon as Nixon and Kissinger returned from a two-day summit
with French President Georges Pompidou at the Azores, the
intensity of the crisis ratcheted up even before the two had
returned to American soil. Once Air Force One landed at Andrews
AFB, members of the press scurried to report potentially
groundbreaking news that the President might cancel the Moscow
summit. The source of the news was none other than some comments
Kissinger made on the plane that were supposed to be
“unattributed,” a journalistic rule of thumb known as the
“Lindley Rule.”70 In violation of a gentlemen’s agreement that
went back to the 1950s, the Washington Post attributed
the comments to the National Security Adviser on the front page
the next morning.71 The Post story distracted Nixon and
Kissinger’s attention from what would become a much larger
problem inextricably linked to the India-Pakistan crisis: the
Anderson leaks. An investigative journalist in the mold of
turn-of-the-century muckrakers, Anderson later topped Nixon’s
much publicized “enemies list.” In particular, Anderson’s
syndicated column of December 14th set in motion a fast-paced
White House investigation.72 The investigation was led by John
Ehrlichman and the White House “Plumbers,” which had been
assembled in the wake of the publication of the Pentagon
Papers earlier that year.73 The Plumbers investigation
turned up some alarming news. Under polygraphic interrogations
on December 15th and 16th, Yeoman Charles Radford revealed that
the leadership of the US military had been spying on the White
House through the JCS-NSC liaison office, and, more
specifically, on Kissinger—the lynchpin in the backchannels to
the Soviets—since November 1970.74
By December 15th, the UN Security Council was deadlocked.
Representing Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto eloquently argued
that the Security Council’s failure to act effectively legalized
Indian aggression against Pakistan. Bhutto then stormed out of
the session. Kissinger-Vorontsov exchanges later that day
reflected differences of opinion over the UN deadlock: the US
continued to support a UK resolution, while the Soviets pushed a
Polish resolution. The real emphasis of the meeting was
preventing hostilities in West Pakistan, coupled with a sense
that a failure to maintain solidarity in the UN could reflect
poorly on the status of US-Soviet relations.75
The Nixon White House was clearly displeased that the US and the
Soviet Union could not agree to jointly call for a simple
ceasefire and withdrawal. Both superpowers had raised the stakes
by dispatching naval forces to the Bay of Bengal, and rising
tension in the backchannel exchanges reflected increasing
antagonism. In a phone call with Kissinger on the morning of
December 16, Nixon vented his anger with the Soviets over the
course of events. If the Indians failed to accept a ceasefire,
after the US had privately applied pressure to the Soviets,
Nixon said, “Now in the event we are going to end up by saying
to the Russians, ‘You proved to be so untrustworthy we can’t
deal with you on any issues.’” Kissinger saw some hope for the
Soviets pushing the Indians into accepting a ceasefire. “They
still may get us a ceasefire,” the National Security Advisor
stated.76
With much greater speed than the carefully crafted and symbolic
actions of the Kissinger-Vorontsov exchanges, the meeting with
Matskevich, the hotline messages, and the frequent phone calls
between the White House and the Soviet embassy, the war in South
Asia ended. On the afternoon of December 16, 1971, India
accepted Pakistan’s unconditional surrender in the East, and
hostilities quickly came to a close the next day after India
announced a ceasefire in the West. Negotiations over war
reparations, POWs, and the political settlement for East
Pakistan—now the new nation of Bangladesh—lasted for several
months. The lesson Nixon and Kissinger took away from the
Indo-Pakistani conflict was that the US needed to act tough with
the Soviets, which reinforced their earlier impressions of how
to deal effectively with the Soviets.77
Conclusion
Added to extant documentary collections, the surreptitiously
taped conversations relating to US-Soviet backchannel and the
nearly complete documentary record of exchanges between
Kissinger and Dobrynin, Kissinger and Vorontsov, and Nixon and
Brezhnev show the Nixon administration’s desire to take a hard
line with the Soviet Union and to compel the Soviets to restrain
the Indians. Although Nixon and Kissinger contended that their
actions had forced the Soviet hand and removed the Indian threat
of dismembering West Pakistan, the case is still not closed and
full confirmation is still not entirely possible in the absence
of materials relating to Indian cabinet meetings, notes of the
Soviet Politburo, and Indo-Soviet exchanges.
The critics stand on solid ground in arguing that Nixon and
Kissinger personalized policy with anti-Indian zeal and sympathy
for Yahya, although arguing that these prejudices defined
American policy is not entirely accurate. Nixon’s and
Kissinger’s behavior clearly remained within the rational actor
model, based on perceived national interests. Initially,
Pakistan served as the gateway to Sino-American rapprochement,
and then US commitment to a shared ally was designed to impress
the Chinese. Moreover, India’s tangible support for the Mukti
Bahini attacks into Pakistan alienated the White House. Nixon’s
and Kissinger’s prejudicial background, if anything, confirmed
their policy perceptions and resulted in more than one outburst
captured for posterity by Nixon’s taping system. Nixon’s
personal experience with the Indians and the Pakistanis, and
with Gandhi and Yahya in particular, confirmed his views of
Indian “aggression” and Pakistani good faith at facilitating the
opening to China and accepting Indian concessions, such as
allowing UN observers and keeping Mujib alive. Talk of
“toughness,” “bold action,” and “coming across as men,”
reflected the White House sentiments about masculine virtues,
while derogatory remarks about Indira Gandhi reflected the
gendered speech of dealing with a very shrewd, tough woman who
transcended supposed feminine vices.
On the charge of conflating regional issues with the global Cold
War game, the critics of the Nixon administration have a
stronger case. Nixon and Kissinger displayed amazing
indifference to the fact that the Indians and the Pakistanis
were pursuing their own national interests on the Subcontinent.
However, the critics’ charge that the White House risked World
War Three by its allegedly reckless actions is somewhat
mitigated following a review of the fuller documentary record
and the substance of US rhetoric and actions via US-Soviet
backchannels. The messages to the Soviets primarily revolved
around joint action at the UN and encouraging the Soviets to
impose restraint on the part of their special ally, India. The
backchannel exchanges show a steady—not reckless—progression of
actions. At no point did Nixon increase the readiness status of
US strategic nuclear forces. The movement of Task Force 74 for
ostensibly humanitarian purposes, to aid the evacuation of
American citizens from East Pakistan, was plausible, and the
real reason—as a response to Soviet naval movements and as a
signal to India—was not unjustified.
Nixon’s policies on South Asia provided an ideal opportunity for
Kissinger to centralize the policy formulation and
implementation in the White House. Kissinger bypassed Secretary
of State Rogers and the State Department with an impressive
degree of self-promotion. Nixon did not completely bypass the
State Department during the crisis and war, but he limited its
role to presenting the public case at the UN and managing the
refugee crisis. Nixon and Kissinger genuinely believed that
India had instigated the hostilities and they believed that
India had designs on West Pakistan incompatible with US
interests. However, the only way to prove that one way or
another would be for Indian archives to open to the extent which
American sources have become available.
The situation on the Subcontinent ultimately defied the attempts
of the superpowers to manage the crisis. The actions of Indira
Gandhi, Yahya Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and Mujibur Rahman were
ultimately more important in determining the final outcome than
those of Nixon, Kissinger, Vorontsov, and Brezhnev.
Nevertheless, the Nixon White House reliance on backchannels
with the Soviet-Union (and tilting to China at the UN) was
triangular diplomacy in action. As Jussi Hanhimäki has argued,
the tilt towards Pakistan was, essentially, a tilt toward China.
The policy actors on all sides were playing roles partially
prescribed by Cold War divisions. The procedures they
established would prove more useful as Nixon went to China and
as the North Vietnamese launched the largest offensive since
1968 against South Vietnam.
Notes:
The views presented
in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the US
government or our employers. This article, which originally
appeared in Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies
Vol. 2, No. 3 (2010), authored by Luke A. Nichter and Richard A.
Moss, is a condensed chapter in Dr. Moss’ dissertation,
Behind the Backchannel: Achieving Détente in US-Soviet
Relations, 1969-1972 (The George Washington University,
2009). The authors wish to thank Anand Toprani, Dennis Kux, Len
Colodny, James Rosen, and W. Taylor Fain for input and/or
transcripts cited in this paper.
1. Nixon tapes
(NT), Executive Office Building (EOB) Conv. No. 309-1, December
24, 1971, 12:00 – 1:37 p.m.
2. Nixon tapes, NT,
Oval Office (OVAL) Conv. No. 699-1 between Nixon and Kissinger,
March 31, 1972, 10:13–11:14 a.m.
3. Richard M.
Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York:
Touchstone,
1978), p.530.
4. Henry A.
Kissinger, White House Years (hereafter cited as WHY),
(Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1979), pp.842-918.
5. Kissinger,
WHY, p.856. Nixon famously wrote by hand on a memo, “Policy
Options
Towards Pakistan,” of April 28, 1971, on “Policy Options Towards
Pakistan:
“To all hands. Don’t squeeze Yahya at this time.” F. S.
Aijazuddin correctly notes
that the language did not originate with the Nixon, but rather
in a cover memo from
President, but actually with Alexander Haig, who wrote in a
cover memo, “Henry
has suggested…you could include a note to the effect that you
want no actions
taken at this time which would squeeze West Pakistan.” The cover
memo is in
Aijazuddin, The White House and Pakistan: Secret Declassified
Documents, 1969-1974
(Karachi: Oxford UP, 2004), p.241. The longer memo from
Kissinger to the
President in Ibid,
pp.242–247; and FRUS, IX, pp.94–98.
6. Kissinger,
WHY, p.856.
7. Kissinger,
WHY, p.867.
8. Kissinger,
WHY, 913.
9. Jack Anderson,
The Anderson Papers with George Clifford (New York:
Random
House, 1973) pp. 205–269; Christopher Van Hollen, “The Tilt
Policy Revisited:
Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics And South Asia,” Asian Survey,
Vol. 20, No. 4.
(April, 1980) pp.339–361; T. N. Kaul, The Kissinger Years:
Indo-American Relations
(New Delhi: Arnold Heinemann, 1980); Seymour M. Hersh,
The Price of
Power: Power Kissinger in the Nixon White House
(New York: Summit Books,
1983) pp.444–479;
Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation:
American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan revised
edition (Washington: Brookings,
1994) pp.296–322; William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of
Foreign Policy
in the Nixon Presidency
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1998) pp.269–292; Walter
Isaacson,
Kissinger (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992) pp.371–376;
Christopher
Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, (London: Verso,
2001) pp.44–55;
Jussi Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and
American Foreign
Policy
(New York: Oxford UP, 2004) pp.154–184, 187–191; Robert Dallek,
Nixon
and Kissinger: Partners in Power
(New York: Harper Collins, 2007) pp.325–368.
10. Anderson,
Anderson Papers, p.205.
11. Aijazuddin,
The White House and Pakistan; Roedad Khan, ed., The
American
Papers: Secret And Confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh
Documents 1965–1973
(Karachi: Oxford UP, 1999); US Department of State, Foreign
Relations of
the United States
(hereafter cited as FRUS), v.I, Foundations of Foreign
Policy
1969–1972
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2003); FRUS, 1969-1976, v. XI,
South Asia
Crisis 1971
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2005); FRUS, 1969-1976, v. E7,
Documents
on South Asia 1969–1972
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e7/index.htm.
12. The bulk of the
tapes on the lead-up to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and
during the war itself have been publicly available for the
better part of a decade.
Aside from the transcripts in the two Foreign Relations
volumes and the work of
W. Taylor Fain, the authors have not seen any original research
on the tapes related
to South Asia. FRUS cited previously.. Also, W. Taylor
Fain, “We’ve Always
Done Well With The Daring Games”: The Nixon Tapes, The
Indo-Pakistani War
Of 1971, And The Early Travails Of Detente,” conference paper
(Dobbiaco, Italy:
CD-ROM Document Reader; Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies,
2002). We
hypothesize that the logistical challenges to using these early
tapes releases by the
National Archives, such as the tapes being available only on
relatively poor quality
audiocassettes (versus Compact Discs) and access being
geographically limited
to the audio-visual room in College Park, MD, are the reason
most scholars have
invested finite research time on document collection rather than
listening to and
transcribing the tapes. Our website, nixontapes.org, contains a
digitized collection
available to anyone with a web connection, with the hope that
scholars and the public
can more easily access the tapes.
13. Because
Dobrynin was in the Soviet Union during the actual war, his
backchannel
duties temporarily shifted to the Soviet charge d’affaires, Yuly
Vorontsov. US
Department of State, Soviet-American Relations: The Détente
Years, 1969-1972,
Introductions by Henry A. Kissinger and Anatoly Dobrynin
(Washington, DC:
GPO, 2007) Hereafter cited as Détente Years.
14. Geoffrey
Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the breakup of Pakistan, 1971,”
International
Affairs
81, 5 (2005) p.1098.
15. “Samuel
Hoskinson and Richard Kennedy to Kissinger,” May 25, 1971, in
FRUS,
v.XI, p.146.
16. HAK Telcons,
Dobrynin File, Box 27, and “Kissinger-Dobrynin Memcon
(USSR),” June 10, 1971, Détente Years, p.374.
17. HAK Telcons,
Dobrynin File, Box 27. Also, Détente Years, p.372.
18.
“Kissinger-Dobrynin Memcon (USSR),” June 30, 1971, Détente
Years, p.391.
Also, Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp.224–225.
19. Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko and Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh
officially signed the treaty in New Delhi on August 9. For an
English translation
of the text, see R. K. Jain, ed., Soviet-South Asian
Relations, 1947–1978, v.1, (Atlantic
Heights, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979), pp.113–116. We are
indebted to Tanvi
Madan for the “insurance policy” analogy.
20. Kissinger was
likely referring to John Kenneth Galbraith, who served as the US
Ambassador to India during the Kennedy administration.
21. NT, OVAL Conv.
No. 557-1, August 9, 1971, 8:52–11:47 a.m.
22. “Kissinger to
Nixon: Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko,” no date,
NPMP, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files,
Europe, USSR,
Gromyko, 1971–1972, NARA II.
23. “Memorandum of
Conversation,” White House Special Files, President’s Office
Files, Box 86. Also, NT, OVAL Conv. No. 580-18 between Nixon,
Gromyko,
Kissinger, Rogers, et al, September 29, 1971, 3:00-4:40 p.m.
24. NT, OVAL Conv.
No. 580-20, September 29, 1971, 4:40-5:00 p.m.
25. Richard Sisson
and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the
Creation of Bangladesh
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1990), p.242.
26. Dallek,
Nixon and Kissinger, p.339.
27. Although Dallek
is generally correct, he evidently confused some of his
documentary
sources. Dallek states: “According to Gandhi, during their
[November 5,
1971] conversation, [Nixon] had Kissinger do most of the
talking.” Furthermore,
Dallek refutes Gandhi’s statements by stating, “The official
transcript in Nixon’s
National Security files drawn from an audiotape is a dialogue
strictly between the
President and the prime minister.” Dallek, pp.339, 340. The
memo—not a transcript—apparently drafted by Kissinger, was
certainly not drawn from an audiotape,
which was unknown to Kissinger at the time. No notation on the
memo suggests
that the conversation was taped. See: FRUS, South Asia,
E7, online: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e7/48213.htm
The conversation was in fact taped, but
Dallek does not cite the conversation, which is: NT, OVAL Conv.
No. 615-23, November
5, 1971, 11:21 a.m. -12:20 p.m. The conversation did not appear
in either print or electronic publication versions of FRUS
on South Asia, and has never been
published before.
28. NT, OVAL Conv.
No. 613-15, November 4, 1971, 10:29 a.m. - 12:35 p.m.
29. For example,
Raymond Garthoff writes, “On December 3 the Pakistani air force
attacked eight Indian airfields in the region around West
Pakistan, and Pakistani
armored forces thrust into the part of Kashmir administered by
India. This action
opened the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.” Détente and
Confrontation, p.298. Détente
and Confrontation,
f.n. 12, p.298. Robert Dallek entirely ignores the events
of November 1971,
arguing, “When a full-scale war finally erupted on December
3, the CIA could not say which country had initiated the
hostilities. Nevertheless,
Nixon and Kissinger blamed New Delhi.” Nixon and Kissinger,
p.341. Isaacson,
Kissinger,
p.374.
30. For example, at
a WSAG meeting on November 12, 1971, Joseph Sisco said:
“Indian strategy has been to continue the pressure on Yahya and
to suck Pakistan
in militarily so that the principal onus for starting a war
would fall on Pakistan.”
FRUS,
XI, p.506.
31. Isaacson,
Kissinger, p.374. Yahya’s cable is published in full in
Aijazuddin, The
White House and Pakistan,
pp.364–366. Also, FRUS, XI, f.n.4, p.539.
32. Sisson and
Rose, War and Secession, p.214.
33. “Minutes of
WSAG Meeting,” November 22, 1971, FRUS, XI, p.532.
34.
“Nixon-Kissinger Telcon,” November 22, 1971, 12:45p.m., HAK
Telcons,
Chronological File, Box 12. Also quoted in FRUS, XI,
pp.536–537.
35. FRUS,
XI, p.537.
36. In his memoirs,
Kissinger recounted his “first secret meeting with the Chinese
in New York,” Huang Hua, on November 23, 1971. Kissinger, WHY,
p.889. A transcript
of the meeting, prepared by Winston Lord, is included in “The
Lead-Up to
Nixon’s Trip to China: US and Chinese Documents and Tapes,”
William Burr, ed.,
with Sharon Chamberlain, Gao Bei, and Zhao Hun,” May 22, 2002,
online: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc22.pdf
<accessed December
10, 2008>.
37. NT, OVAL Conv.
No. 622-1, November 22, 1971, 3:51 p.m. – 3:58 p.m.
38. “Telegram from
State Department (Washington) to Embassy in Pakistan
(Islamabad),”
November 28, 1971, 0101Z, FRUS, XI, pp.565-566. Also,
OVAL Conv.
No. 622-1, November 22, 1971, 3:51 – 3:58 p.m.
39. “Telegram from
the Department of State (Washington) to the Embassy in the
Soviet Union (Moscow), November 27, 1971, 0103Z, FRUS,
XI, p.569.
40. Indian Prime
Minister Gandhi spoke to her nation on December 3 1971 noting
that the Pakistani Air Force had struck six Indian airfields and
was shelling positions
along the Indian-West Pakistani border. In response, Pakistan
claimed it was responding to “aggressive” Indian reconnaissance
over West Pakistan. FRUS, XI,
p.592.
41.
“Kissinger-Nixon Telcon,” December 3, 1971, 10:45 a.m. in
FRUS, XI, pp.593-594.
42. The minutes of
the first meeting were among the leaked documents published
by Jack Anderson, in which Kissinger famously said—and has been
oft-quoted
in news stories and histories ever since, “I’ve been catching
unshirted hell every
half-hour from the President who says we’re not tough enough. He
believes State
is pressing us to be tough and I’m resisting…He wants to tilt
toward Pakistan.”
“WSAG Minutes,” December 3, 1971, 11:19-11:55 a.m., FRUS,
XI, p.597.
43. FRUS,
XI, pp.596-604. Kissinger also convened the WSAG on December 4,
1971. DCI Helms noted how the Soviet Union had shifted its
position from opposing
an Indo-Pakistani war “to the conclusion that Moscow would not
do much to try
to halt hostilities.” FRUS, XI, fn 3, p.621. Also,
FRUS, XI, pp.620-627.
44.
“Kissinger-Nixon Telcon,” December 5, 1971, no time, HAK
Telcons, Home
File, Box 29. Also, FRUS, XI, pp.635-640.
45.
“Kissinger-Vorontsov Memcon,” December 5, 1971, NPMP,
President’s Trip
Files, Box 492, NARA II.
46.
“Kissinger-Vorontsov Telcon,” December 6, 1971, 3:32 p.m., HAK
Telcons,
Chronological File, Box 12.
47. “Nixon to
Brezhnev,” December 6, 1971, Détente Years, p.532.
48. “Brezhnev to
Nixon,” December 6, 1971, NPMP, NSC Files, President’s Trip
Files, Box 492, NARA II. Also, Memorandum for the President from
Henry Kissinger,
December 8, NPMP, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files,
Dobrynin/Kissinger
1971, v. 8. Box 492.
49. In his memoirs,
Nixon wrote of the September 1970 Jordanian Crisis: “However,
one thing was clear. We could not allow Hussein to be overthrown
by a Soviet inspired
insurrection. If it succeeded, the entire Middle East might
erupt in war…Soviet prestige was on the line with both the
Syrians and the Egyptians. Since the
United States could not stand idly by and watch Israel being
driven into the sea,
the possibility of a direct US-Soviet confrontation was
uncomfortably high. It was
like a ghastly game of dominoes, with a nuclear war waiting at
the end.” Nixon,
RN,
p.483.
50. NT, OVAL Conv.
No. 630-2, December 6, 1971, 12:02 – 12:06 p.m.
51. NT, OVAL Conv.
No. 630-10, December 6, 1971, 3:04 – 3:08 p.m.
52. “Haig-Vorontsov
Telcon,” December 8, 1971, 3:50 p.m., Détente Years,
f.n.3,
p.533.
53. NT, EOB Conv.
No. 307-27 between Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, December
8, 1971, 4:20-5:01 p.m., FRUS, E-7.
54. “Brezhnev to
Nixon,” December 8, 1971, Détente Years, pp.534-535.
55. “Telegram from
Vorontsov to the Soviet Foreign Ministry,” December 9, 1971,
Détente Years,
pp.535-536.
56. Henry A.
Kissinger, “Memorandum for the President,” December 9, 1971.
NPMP, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 492, NARA II.
57. OVAL Conv. No.
634-12, FRUS, E-7.
58. “Nixon,
Matskevich, Vorontsov, Kissinger Memcon: Memorandum for the
President’s File,” Washington, December 9, 1971, FRUS,
XIV, p.771.
59. The Soviets
were likely protesting the tacit American encouragement that
Pakistan
receive military aid through third parties, such as Iran and
Jordan. FRUS,
XIV. Also, “Kissinger-Bhutto Telcon,” December 12, 1971, no
time, HAK Telcons,
Chronological File, Box 11.
60. NT, OVAL Conv.
No. 635–8, December 10, 1971, 10:51-11:12 a.m., FRUS,
E-7.
61. “Nixon to
Brezhnev,” December 10, 1971, FRUS XI, pp.745-746.
62. Détente
Years, p.538. FRUS, 1961-1963, v. XIX, South Asia,
Document 191.
63. “Nixon to
Brezhnev,” December 10, 1971, FRUS XI, pp.745-746.
64. “Memcon Huang
Hua, Ch’en Ch’u, T’ang Wen’sheng, Kissinger, Bush, Haig
and Lord,” December 10, 1971, 6;05 – 7:55 p.m., New York
City-East Side, DNSA
online.
65.
“Kissinger-Vorontsov Telcon,” December 11, 1971, c.a. 3:00 p.m.,
Détente
Years,
pp.539-540.
66. NT, OVAL Conv.
No. 637-3 between Nixon and Kissinger, December 12, 1971,
8:45 – 9:42 a.m.
67.
“Kissinger-Vorontsov Telcon,” December 12, 1971, 10:05 a.m., HAK
Telcons,
Chronological File, Box 12.
68. “Nixon to
Brezhnev,” December 12, 1971, Détente Years, p.543.
69. “Soviet Hotline
Message,” December 13, 1971, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 492,
NARA II.
70. William Safire,
“ON LANGUAGE: Off the Record,” New York Times (October
29, 1989)
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE6DC1F3CF93AA15753C1A96F948260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all
71. James M.
Naughton, “Nixon May Review Trip Unless Soviet Curbs India,”
The
New York Times
(December 15, 1971) p.1.
72. Jack Anderson,
“The Washington Merry-Go-Round: US, Soviet vessels in Bay
of Bengal,” The Washington Post (December 14, 1971)
p.B15.
73. James Rosen, The Strong Man, p.169.
74. Len Colodny,
“Excerpt of an interview with Admiral Moorer,” January 27,
1987, online:
http://www.nixonera.com/media/audio/transcripts/moorer.asp
<accessed: May 7, 2009>.
75.
“Kissinger-Vorontsov Memcon (US),” December 15, 1971, Détente
Years,
pp.552–553. “Kissinger-Vorontsov Memcon (USSR),” December 15,
1971, Détente
Years,
pp.553–554.
76. FRUS,
XI, pp.837-841.
77. OVAL Conv. No.
652-17, January 20, 1972, 6:08 – 6:36 p.m., FRUS, XIV,
pp.119-121. Also, “Kissinger to Nixon,” December 16, 1971,
FRUS, XI, pp.843–846,
esp. p.845.
|